Out-of-Court Statements: The Concentric Hoops of the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause by McLain, Lynn
University of Baltimore Law
ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship
9-2009
Out-of-Court Statements: The Concentric Hoops
of the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause
Lynn McLain
University of Baltimore, lmclain@ubalt.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of
Law. For more information, please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lynn McLain, Out-of-Court Statements: The Concentric Hoops of the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause, (2009).
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/all_fac/915
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636963
i 
 
 Out-of-Court Statements:   
 The Concentric Hoops of the Hearsay Rule 
and the Confrontation Clause 
 
 Maryland Judicial Institute 
 September 2009 
 Professor Lynn McLain 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
 
 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 
 
 Contents 
 Page 
 
I. Framework for Analysis of Whether an Out-of-Court Statement is Admissible ...... 1 
 
II. Is The Evidence Hearsay?  ......................................................................................... 1 
 
 A. What is Hearsay?  .......................................................................................... 1 
 
  1. The Two Elements of ―Out-of-Court‖ ―Statement‖ .......................... 2 
 
  2. Making and Meeting Hearsay Objections  ......................................... 3 
 
  3. ―TOMA‖? or Nonhearsay?  ............................................................... 3 
 
  4. Important Recent Maryland Decisions: Implied Assertions  ............. 6 
 
 B. Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject 
  to the Confrontation Clause   ......................................................................... 8 
 
III. Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements Under the Rules of Evidence ................. 9 
 
 A. When Hearsay is Offered, Any Hearsay Exception That Fits Will Work ..... 9 
 
 B. Judge‘s Determination of Admissibility  ....................................................... 10 
 
 C. Is Competency of the Out-of-Court Declarant at the  
  Time of Trial Required? ................................................................................ 10 
 
IV. Crawford‘s Reframing of the Confrontation Clause Analysis  ................................. 12 
 
 A. In General  ................................................................................................ 12 
 
 B. In Determining Whether a Statement is Testimonial, Does  
  It Matter that the Declarant Was a Child?  .................................................... 13 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636963
ii 
 
 
 C. What Did Crawford and Davis Hold as to Whether a Statement 
  is Testimonial or Nontestimonial?  ................................................................ 14 
 
 D. What of Statements Not Made During Interrogation by the Police  
  or an Agent of the Police? .............................................................................. 18 
 
  1. Elicitation by Police or Their Agents ................................................ 18 
 
  2. Statements to Others  ......................................................................... 18 
 
  3. Less Formal, More Spontaneous Statements  .................................... 19 
 
V. Excited Utterances  ................................................................................................ 19  
 
 A. Are Excited Utterances Testimonial?  ........................................................... 19 
 
  1. Crawford Cast Doubt on White v. Illinois  ........................................ 19 
 
  2. Davis  ................................................................................................ 21 
 
  3. Excited Utterances to Persons Not Law Enforcement Agents  .......... 21 
 
 B. Application of Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2) in the Context of Child Declarants  .... 22 
 
VI. Statements Made in Seeking Medical Diagnosis or Treatment  ................................ 23 
 
 A. Qualifying Statements under the Hearsay Exception of  
  Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4)  .................................................................................... 23 
 
  1. Declarant‘s Motive: Requisite Understanding  
   of Medical Relevance  ....................................................................... 23 
  
  2. Statements Must Be ―Reasonably Pertinent to  
   Diagnosis or Treatment‖  ................................................................... 24 
 
 B. Are Md. Rule 803(b)(4) Statements ―Testimonial‖?  .................................... 26  
 
  1. Police Involvement Present or Inferrable  ......................................... 27 
  
  2. No Police Involvement ...................................................................... 27 
  
  3. Effect of Child Abuse Reporting Requirement  ................................. 28  
 
VII. ―Tender Years‖ and ―Catch-All‖ Exceptions  ........................................................... 29 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1636963
iii 
 
VIII. Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements When Child Testifies; State 
 Law Hearsay Exception for Prompt Complaints of Sexual Assault  ......................... 30 
 
IX. Maryland‘s Hearsay Exceptions Derived from Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6): 
 A Criminal Statute and a Civil Rule  ......................................................................... 30 
 
 A. The Criminal Statute  ..................................................................................... 30 
 
  1. Restrictive in Scope: Types of Cases ................................................. 31 
 
  2. Departure from Usual Procedure under Md. Rule 5-104(a) .............. 32 
 
  3. Restrictive in Scope: Types of Out-of-Court Statements  ................. 32 
 
  4. Notice  ................................................................................................ 32 
 
 B. The Civil Rule  ............................................................................................... 32 
 
X. Other Significant Developments  ............................................................................... 33 
 
 A. Melendez-Diaz  .............................................................................................. 33 
 
 B. Rule 5-802.1(a): Certain Prior Inconsistent Statements  ............................... 33 
 
 C. Rule 5-802.1(c): Prior Statements of Identification  ...................................... 33 
 
 D. Rule 5-803(a): Statement of Party Opponent ................................................ 34 
 
 E. Rule 5-803(b)(3): Direct Assertion of Declarant‘s State of Mind  ................ 34 
 
 F. Rule 5-803(b)(6): Business Records  ............................................................. 34 
 
 G. Rule 5-803(b)(8): Public Records/‖Business Records‖ of the State? ............ 34 
 
 H. Rule 5-804(b)(2): Dying Declarations  .......................................................... 35 
 
 I. Rule 5-805: Multiple Levels of OCS‘s Within One OCS ............................. 35 
 
 J. Doctor‘s Apology........................................................................................... 35 
 
 K. Impeachment of Nontestifying Hearsay Declarants: Md. Rule 5-806 ........... 35 
 
XI. Hypotheticals   ................................................................................................ 36 
 
XII. Appendix:  Fact Patterns  ........................................................................................... 37
1 
 
I. Framework for Analysis of Whether an Out-of-Court Statement is Admissible 
To determine whether evidence of an out-of-court statement is admissible, one must 
make several determinations.  If the evidence passes muster under the rules of evidence, then one 
must ask if its admission would violate the Constitution:    
 
(1) Is the proffered evidence “hearsay” (as defined in Md. Rule 5-801(a)-
(c))?  If the evidence is nonhearsay, neither the hearsay rule nor the 
Confrontation Clause will exclude it.     
 
(2) If it is hearsay, is it nonetheless not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
because it qualifies under an exception to that rule (Md. Rule 5-803-
804)?   
 
(3) Even if the hearsay rule does not exclude it, do other evidence rules 
exclude it (e.g., Md. Rule 5-403)?   
 
 If rules of evidence do not exclude it, then one must ask whether the 
Constitution bars its consideration. 
 
(4) If it is offered at a trial on the merits
1
 against a criminal accused, is it 
Atestimonial@ hearsay?  If it is testimonial, then its admission must 
comply with the confrontation clause.  
 
(5) Even if the confrontation clause is inapplicable, but the evidence is offered 
in any proceeding to which the due process clause applies, is the evidence 
reliable?  See, e.g., Cotto v. Herbert, 331 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 2003) (a 
verdict based on unreliable evidence violates the losing party=s due 
process right). 
 
II. Is The Evidence Hearsay?  
 
A. What is Hearsay?   
 
Evidence is hearsay if (1) an out-of-court statement (any time other than from this 
witness stand at this trial) of a person (including a hearsay declarant who is also testifying 
at trial) (“OCS”) is being proved, and (2) in order for that OCS to help to prove the fact it is 
being offered to prove today at trial, the fact-finder would have to assume that the out-of-
court speaker or writer (the “declarant”) believed a particular fact to be true and that the 
declarant was correct, i.e., that fact was true.  The shorthand for this last element is that 
the OCS is offered now to prove the truth of some matter that was (explicitly or implicitly) 
asserted by the declarant when the declarant made the statement (―TOMA‖): OCS + TOMA 
= Hearsay. 
                                                 
1  See, e.g., Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 740 (1987) (defendant=s exclusion from incompetency hearing in 
judge=s chambers regarding child witnesses= competency after jury was sworn did not violate his confrontation right 
as it did not impinge upon his ability to cross-examine them at trial on the merits). 
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  1. The Two Elements of ―Out-of-Court‖ ―Statement‖  
 
 Rule 5-801(c) defines OCS as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing. . . .”  Rule 5-801(a) defines a ―statement‖ as “(1) an 
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the 
person as an assertion.”  It can be fairly said, then, that a ―statement‖ is an assertion of fact(s) 
by a person. 
 
 Because of the first part of the definition in Rule 5-801(c), for purposes of the rules of 
evidence even the prior statement of a witness who is testifying today at trial is considered 
an OCS.  Thus the hearsay rule excludes a witness‟s own prior statements unless either (1) they 
are offered only for a relevant nonhearsay purpose or (2) the proper foundation has been laid to 
support a finding by the trial judge that they fall within a particular hearsay exception (or 
exceptions).  This may be surprising, because, after all, this witness declarant can be cross-
examined at trial.  Thus, this preference for live memory is reflected only in a rule of evidence, 
and not in the confrontation clause. 
 
Problems. 
 
Does “statement” in Rule 5-801(a) include: 
 
 a. A parrot‘s exclamation, when the police entered the apartment to find the dead 
body of Jennifer, the owner of the parrot, ―Richard stabbed me!  Richard stabbed 
me!‖ 
 
 b. A hand-stamped ―Received April 12, 2003" on a document? 
 
 c. A gas and electric bill, stating that the homeowner owed $310.06 for July 2007? 
 
 d. Does ―statement‖ include the mass-printed writing on a cocktail napkin, 
―Bohager‘s, Fells Point, Baltimore‖?   
 
In each case, whom would you want to cross examine?  In United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 
225 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 2856 (2009), Judge Niemeyer, writing for the panel 
majority over Judge Michael=s dissent, held that data generated by an Armed Forces Institute=s 
Forensic Toxicology Laboratory, showing that the defendant=s blood sample contained ethanol 
and phencyclidine, were not hearsay, because the machine performing chromatography on the 
defendant=s blood was not a ―person‖ and therefore could not be a ―declarant‖ under Fed. R. 
Evid. 801.
2
  Accord United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361-62 (7th Cir. 2008) (instruments‘ 
                                                 
2  The lab in Washington used: 
 
a Hewlett Packard HP 6890 series gas chromatograph machine and computers with HP ChemStation 
software.  After lab technicians subjected the blood sample to testing, the instruments printed out some 20 
pages of data and graphs.  Based on the data, the director of the lab and its chief toxicologist, Dr. Barry 
Levine, issued a report to the United States Park Police, stating that the blood sample Acontained 27 mg/dL 
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readings were not statements, though expert‘s conclusions based on them were), cert. denied, 
129 S.Ct. 40 (U.S. 2008), and cert. denied sub nom. Alexander v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 39 
(U.S. 2008).  The facts of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009), do not raise 
this question, because there the evidence was not a machine printout but a drug analysis 
certificate by a person, based on the machine readings (and the evidence was admitted without 
the testimony of any sponsoring witness).   
 
 It is noteworthy, and perhaps critical, that in United States v. Washington no issue as to 
authentication or chain of custody was presented or preserved. 
 
  2. Making and Meeting Hearsay Objections 
 
   a. If a hearsay objection is properly made because the evidence 
includes an OCS, the proponent of the evidence must meet the 
objection by explaining to the court how either the evidence is 
nonhearsay or it falls within a hearsay exception.  Otherwise, 
the court may correctly sustain the objection. 
 
   b. Timeliness.  One can object in anticipation — but the objection is 
not technically called for until the hearsay itself is asked for. 
 
  3. ―TOMA‖? or Nonhearsay? 
 
 Remember, an OCS is not hearsay if it is probative of and offered to prove a 
RELEVANT fact other than “TOMA” (the truth of any fact asserted by the declarant when the 
declarant made the OCS).  All evidence must comply with Rule 5-402, requiring relevance.  
Offering evidence for a nonhearsay purpose that is not relevant will not provide a route around 
the hearsay rule.  E.g., Boyd v. State, 399 Md. 457, 924 A.2d 1112 (2007). 
 
 An easy way to look at the TOMA element is to ask, “Even if the out-of-court 
declarant was factually incorrect with regard to the assertion s/he made in the OCS, is it still 
relevant that the declarant made the statement?”  “Is it relevant simply that the OCS was 
made?”  If the answer to either of these questions is yes, the evidence is NONHEARSAY.  
(A limiting instruction under Rule 5-105 may be appropriate.) 
                                                                                                                                                             
of ethanol@ and that the sample tested positive for phencyclidine, containing A0.04 mg.L of phencyclidine as 
quantitated by gas chromatography/spectrometry.@  While Dr. Levine did not see the blood sample and did 
not conduct any of the tests himself, three lab technicians operating under his protocols and supervision 
conducted the tests and then presented the raw data from the tests to him. 
 
 The raw data were mechanical computer printouts with each page headed by the date of 
the test, the machine operator, an identification of the sample, its dilution factor, and other similar 
information, and containing computer-generated graphs and data reporting the results produced by 
the chromatograph machine. 
 
498 F.3d at 728. 
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Another way of looking at this process is as a bus ride; you jump off the bus as soon as you get 
some probative value as to the fact the OCS is offered to prove. 
 
 
Metrobus 
 
If it doesn‘t matter whether Decl. 
believed what s/he said or not, 
EVI. is probative anyway, 
merely because OCS was made: 
 
 
 
Get off at 
BUS STOP #1:  Nonhearsay 
(Types a, b, or c below) 
   
Metrobus  
 
If EVI. will help to prove fact it‘s 
offered to prove, as long as Decl. 
believed what s/he said, even if 
Decl. was factually wrong. 
 
 
 
Get off at 
BUS STOP # 2:  Nonhearsay 
(Type d below) 
 
Metrobus  
 
If Decl.‘s belief alone is 
insufficient: we need for Decl. 
to have been both sincere and 
factually correct, in order for 
fact-finder to properly rely on 
the Evi. to help to prove the 
Material Fact. 
 
Ride all the way to 
TERMINUS:  Hearsay 
 
 
Problems. 
 
 Witness is called to testify:  ―The shopkeeper told me one of the people who robbed her 
was Wally.‖  Is this evidence hearsay (an OCS + TOMA) if it is offered to prove the following?   
 1. Wally robbed the shopkeeper. 
 
 2. The witness knows the shopkeeper. 
 
 3. The shopkeeper was alive on the day she spoke to the witness. 
 
 4. Wally is a criminal. 
 
 5. The shopkeeper and the witness were ―on speaking terms.‖ 
 
 6. Wally was in the town where the shop is on the day of the robbery. 
 
Analysis:  For example, would the fact that the shopkeeper said to the witness, that ―Wally was 
one of the robbers‖ help to prove that Wally was in that town on the day of the robbery only if 
the shopkeeper was factually correct about one or more of the facts she asserted in the OCS? 
 
 Four categories of OCS‘s that are NONHEARSAY because they are offered for a 
purpose other than to prove TOMA [both belief and accuracy of the declarant as to something 
s/he was asserting at the time the declarant made the OCS] come up repeatedly: 
 
  a. “LEGALLY OPERATIVE FACTS” (Verbal acts or Verbal 
Parts of Acts)  
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    i. VERBAL ACTS (here, generally, the substantive law 
regarding the particular type of claim or defense 
requires that an out-of-court statement have been made 
in order for the type of claim, charge, or defense to 
exist), e.g., contracts; wills; the alleged defamatory 
statement.  You cannot have a contract, for example, 
without an offer and an acceptance.  The utterance of the 
statement(s) creates the claim, etc. 
 
   Example:  Mario sues D for slander.  Mario calls W to 
testify that D said to W, ―Mario is a liar and a cheat.‖  
Mario simply wants to prove that D made the OCS 
(published it to a third person) — certainly not to prove that 
what D said was true.  D has to have made such a type of 
statement in order for Mario to prove the element of 
publication. 
 
   ii. VERBAL PARTS OF ACTS (giving a particular legal 
effect, by virtue of the substantive law, to an otherwise 
legally ambiguous nonverbal act).  These OCS‘s have 
probative value under the substantive law, regardless of the 
declarant‘s sincerity (truthfulness).  For example, the 
statement, ―This is a gift,‖ when handing over a ring, 
makes it a donative transfer, even if the declarant was 
intending to steal the ring back later.  Similarly, a 
threatening statement accompanying an otherwise 
ambiguous act can make the combination an assault. 
 
  b. STATEMENTS OFFERED TO PROVE THEIR EFFECT ON 
THEIR HEARER OR READER 
 
These statements, e.g., statements putting the hearer or reader on notice (―Caution: Wet 
Floor‖) or statements affecting the reasonableness of the hearer‘s or reader‘s subsequent 
conduct (―Don‘t touch that, it‘s hot!‖) are probative for that purpose, regardless of either 
the declarant‘s sincerity or accuracy. 
 
      ● If A testifies that she heard B tell the store manager, 15 minutes before a slip and 
fall, that ―There‘s a spill in Aisle 6,‖ can this evidence be relevant for a 
nonhearsay purpose?  How?  Note that, if offered for a nonhearsay purpose, it 
may not be used as substantive evidence that there was a spill in Aisle 6.  A 
limiting instruction under Rule 5-105 may be requested. 
 
See, e.g., Shipp v. United States, 212 Fed. Appx. 393 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) 
(malicious prosecution case). 
 
  c. STATEMENTS OFFERED AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL 
6 
 
EVIDENCE OF THE DECLARANT’S CONSCIOUSNESS, 
ABILITY TO TALK, ABILITY TO SPEAK A PARTICULAR 
LANGUAGE, ETC.  
 
      ● Neither sincere belief nor accuracy of the declarant is needed for this category of 
non-hearsay.  For example, consider the statement of a person (not the Prince of 
Wales) trapped in a car, ―I am Charles, Prince of Wales,‖ offered to show 
consciousness, which is relevant to conscious pain and suffering, which is 
relevant to damages.  It does not matter whether what the declarant said was true, 
simply that she said something. 
 
  d. STATEMENTS OFFERED AS CIRCUMSTANTIAL -- NOT 
DIRECT -- EVIDENCE OF THE DECLARANT’S EMOTION, 
STATE OF MIND, KNOWLEDGE, BELIEF, INTENT, 
SANITY OR INSANITY  
 
 In this final one of the ―big four‖ categories of nonhearsay, the relevance requirement is 
met if the declarant was sincere, regardless of the declarant‘s accuracy as to the facts asserted by 
him or her.  E.g., in A‘s trial for murder of B, the State calls C to testify to A‘s OCS one week 
before the murder, ―B is not only mean and nasty, he‘s an [expletive deleted].‖  To be relevant to 
the State‘s case, it does not matter whether B was really mean, nasty, etc.  Therefore, it is 
nonhearsay, as we care only that apparently A believed that B was nasty, not whether A was 
correct as to the fact A asserted, that B was nasty. 
 
 See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 397 Md. 557, 575-80, 919 A.2d 49 (2007) (evidence of 
defendant‟s initial refusal to provide a blood sample was properly admitted as circumstantial 
evidence of consciousness of guilt as State had laid proper foundation by showing that defendant 
was told blood was needed in reference to victim‘s death); Holland v. State, 122 Md. App. 532, 
713 A.2d 364 (1998) (witness testified defendant or one of his companions in motel room said 
―We‘re going down the strip to sell‖; Judge Moylan explains:  ―The words were offered as 
circumstantial evidence that either the appellant or the other codefendant who uttered them along 
with others who heard the words were privy to a concerted plan to sell narcotics–on the strip or 
elsewhere, immediately or after the coast was clear.  The very uttering of the words helped to 
show the state of mind of the one who uttered them and/or of others who heard them.  As 
circumstantial evidence used to prove that collective state of mind, to wit, the [charged] 
conspiracy [to sell illegal drugs], the words were non-hearsay.‖). 
 
  4. Important Recent Maryland Decisions: Implied Assertions 
 
 The common law rule of Wright v. Tatham, an 18th century English case, as to verbal 
utterances may be stated as follows: 
 
Verbal utterances are hearsay if offered to prove the truth of 
the matter that was directly asserted by the declarant.  They 
are also hearsay if they are offered to prove the truth of an 
assertion implied by the declarant, i.e., their proponent is 
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asking the fact-finder to infer that the declarant would not 
have made the utterance unless he or she believed a particular 
fact to be true, and the out-of-court utterance is offered to 
prove the truth of that fact the declarant apparently believed. 
 
In Stoddard v. State, 389 Md. 681, 887 A.2d 564 (2005), the Court of Appeals of Maryland (4-
to-3) adopted this approach.  There the OCS was of an 18-month-old child who said to her 
mother, ―Is [the defendant] going to get me?‖  The evidence was relevant only if offered to prove 
that the child had seen the defendant ―get‖ the murder victim. 
 
 Under this approach, each of the following is an OCS + TOMA: 
 
  Evidence      Offered to Prove 
 
 a. D said, ―Do you need change?‖   D had access to change. 
 
 b. D said, ―Carlos, do you have the stuff?‖  Carlos dealt drugs. 
 
 c. D, a burglar, said, ―Ernie, come in here.‖  Ernie was there and was D‘s 
accomplice. 
 
 d. D said to X, ―You wouldn‘t want anything  D was threatening X. 
  to happen to your pretty wife.‖ 
 
 e. D asked X, ―When are you going to pay me   X had borrowed money  
  back my money?‖       from D. 
 
 f. D said to X, his alleged coconspirator, ―Nice  D had never met X before. 
  to meet you.‖ 
 
Contrast: 
 
  Evidence      Offered to Prove 
 
  D said, ―Does your boss have a burglar   D was planning a burglary of 
  alarm?‖      the premises and committed 
it and accompanying murder 
of the store owner. 
 
 Here D‘s intent is relevant.  The evidence is relevant in D‘s subsequent burglary/murder 
trial as circumstantial evidence of D‘s state of mind/intent; one ―gets off the bus‖ before reaching 
any implicit assertion about whether or not there is a burglar alarm.  See Carlton v. State, 111 
Md. App. 436, 681 A.2d 1181 (1996) (finding no intended assertion).   
 
 In Bernadyn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 887 A.2d 602 (2005), the Stoddard majority held that a 
medical bill seized by police at 2024 Morgan Street in Edgewood, Maryland, and addressed to 
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―Michael Bernadyn, 2024 Morgan Street, Edgewood, Maryland 21040,‖ was inadmissible 
hearsay when used by the State to establish that Bernadyn lived at that address. 
 
     ● When that scenario recurs, can the foundation for the bill as a business record be laid as 
to the patient‘s address?  Is there a double hearsay problem? 
 
     ● Or is the bill with that name on it relevant (does it have probative value connecting 
Bernadyn to that address) simply because it was found at that address?  (See Judge 
Wilner‘s dissent.)  Consider if, instead, the bill had been found at a garbage dump—then 
what would the analysis be? 
 
     ● If the State offers the bill, at retrial, only as circumstantial evidence linking someone 
using that name with the address where it was found, will it be admissible for that limited 
purpose?  See Fields v. State, 395 Md. 758, 912 A.2d 637 (2006) (declining to reach the 
issue because error, if any, was harmless) (see also D. Eyler‘s opinion for majority of the 
CSA panel, 168 Md. App. 22, 895 A.2d 339 (2006)); Cooley v. State, 157 Md. App. 101, 
116, 849 A.2d 1026 (2004), rev‟d on other grounds, 385 Md. 165, 867 A.2d 1065 (2005) 
(―The State‘s case included testimony that, when the search warrant was executed about 
6:20 a.m. on July 20, 2001, both Jones and Cooley were present, along with their child.  
Cooley was sleeping when the police arrived.  Both Cooley and Jones were in the 
bedroom at the time the bullet cartridges were recovered.  In addition, paperwork in the 
names of both Jones and Cooley was recovered from the premises.  This evidence was 
sufficient to establish that Cooley and Jones were residing together at 2001 McCullough 
Street when the search warrant was executed.‖). 
 
How far will the Court of Appeals take Stoddard?  Watch Garner v. State, 183 Md. App. 122, 
960 A.2d 649 (2008) (telephone caller‘s question, ―Can I get a 40?‖ is nonhearsay), cert. 
granted, 408 Md. 148, 968 A.2d 1064 (2009).  See MCLAIN, 6A MARYLAND EVIDENCE § 801:4 
(Supp. 2009). 
 
  B. Evidence Offered for a Nonhearsay Purpose is Not Subject to the 
Confrontation Clause 
 
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the confrontation right applies only to 
hearsay.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9 (2004) (―The Clause . . . does not bar the 
use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter 
asserted.‖); Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409 (1985) (defendant=s rights under the confrontation 
clause were not violated by the introduction of the confession of an accomplice for the 
nonhearsay purpose of rebutting respondent=s testimony that his own confession was coercively 
derived from the accomplice=s statement). 
 
The confrontation clause would not bar the admission, for example, of a nontestifying 
hearsay declarant‘s prior consistent testimonial statements, when offered as to her credibility 
only, to rehabilitate her after she has been impeached pursuant to Md. Rule 5-806.  Cf. Holmes v. 
State, 350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998) (discussing admissibility of prior consistent statements 
as to rehabilitation of a testifying witness); United States v. Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 89 n.6 (D.C. 
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Cir. 1976) (prosecution‘s attack on credibility of defendant, on whose out-of-court statements 
defense psychiatrists relied, permits defendant to present supporting evidence, as by character 
witnesses to his good reputation for truth and veracity).  A Md. Rule 5-403 question of whether a 
Md. Rule 5-105 limiting instruction would be effective would remain, however. 
 
 Similarly, Md. Rule 5-703 permits the opinion of a testifying expert to be based on 
inadmissible hearsay.  But an expert‘s reliance on testimonial hearsay of nontestifying declarants 
raises thorny questions.  See United States v. Crockett, 586 F.Supp.2d 877 (E.D. Mich. 2008) 
(prosecution expert may not testify to whether laboratory results showed cocaine, without 
admissible evidence of chain of custody; ―Rule 703 [cannot] be understood to contemplate the 
very judicial balancing that Crawford eschews‖); Comment, Crawford‘s Curious Dictum: Why 
Testimonial “Nonhearsay” Implicates the Confrontation Clause, 82 TUL. L. REV. 297 (2007).  
But see United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 911-12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (no violation of 
confrontation right when prosecution expert relied on testimonial hearsay but did not disclose it 
to jury), cert. denied sub nom. Fletcher v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1023 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2009); 
United States v. Lombardozzi, 491 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2007) (some of prosecution expert‘s opinions 
were based on admissible evidence; admission of other, even if based on testimonial hearsay, 
was not plain error where, inter alia, it did not concern a crime for which defendant was on trial).   
 
III. Admissibility of Out-of-Court Statements Under the Rules of Evidence 
 
 A. When Hearsay is Offered, Any Hearsay Exception That Fits Will Work 
 
 The rules of evidence recognize many hearsay exceptions potentially applicable to, for 
example, children=s out-of-court statements.  Hearsay exceptions of particular interest with 
regard to child declarants include: 
 
1. Excited utterances:  Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 
(1992); see Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); 
 
2. Statements made when seeking medical diagnosis or treatment:  Md. Rule 
5-803(b)(4); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); 
 
3. ATender years@ exceptions, e.g., Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 64, 867 A.2d 
314 (2005); 
 
4. Catch-all or residual exceptions, Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24); see Idaho v. 
Wright, 497 U.S. 809 (1990); 
 
5. The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception:  Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) (civil); 
Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-901 (certain criminal cases only); 
see, e.g., McMenamin, Man Charged in Death of Woodlawn Girl Is 
Expected to Plead Guilty, The Balt. Sun, May 10, 2005, at 5B, col. 1 (15-
year-old girl murdered to keep her from testifying in a third degree sex 
offense case); McMenamin, Murder Trial Pierces Calm of Quiet City in 
New York, The Balt. Sun, Sept. 17, 2004, 1B, col. 1 (Randallstown, MD 
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man charged with murdering 14-year-old girl and her mother, ten days 
before they were to testify in sexual abuse trial in Maryland). 
 
 B. Judge‘s Determination of Admissibility 
 
 When a hearsay objection is made and the proponent of the evidence argues that it falls 
within a hearsay exception, the trial judge decides the issue of admissibility under Md. Rule 5-
104(a).  The judge may admit the evidence only if he or she finds that the preliminary facts 
necessary to lay the required foundation have been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 529, 592 & n.10 (1993).   
 
 The judge nevertheless should exclude the evidence, upon objection, if other evidentiary 
rules so require, for example, if the declarant appears to have lacked first-hand knowledge (Md. 
Rule 5-602; Brown v. Keane, 355 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2004)) or if the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusion of the jury, or 
undue consumption of time (Md. Rule 5-403; United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Historic Preservation 
Trust, 265 F.3d 722, 727-28 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 655-56 (2d 
Cir. 2001)). 
 
 In making these preliminary determinations as to admissibility, the court may consider 
hearsay; it is not bound by the rules of evidence, except those regarding privileges and 
competency of witnesses.  E.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987); United States v. 
Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 107 (D.C. Cir. 1976).   
 
 C. Is Competency of the Out-of-Court Declarant at the Time of Trial Required? 
 
 With regard to the admission of hearsay, the preliminary question as to competency is not 
whether the declarant is competent to testify at the time of trial.  The touchstone instead is 
whether the declarant, when he or she made the out-of-court statement, appears to have 
been capable of perceiving facts accurately and relating them rationally.  See, e.g., Contee v. 
State, 184 A.2d 823, 825-26 (Md. 1962) (prior testimony admissible of declarant who had 
subsequently become insane).  But see Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in 
a “Testimonial” World: The Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 Ind. 
L.J. 1009, 1011-12 (2007) (accepting the rule of King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1779), 
as ―confirm[ing] that an incompetent child‘s hearsay cannot be introduced because the child 
could not be a witness at trial,‖ and treating excited utterances as sui generis because their 
reliability is not premised on child‘s ability to discern truth from a lie); Stoddard v. State, 389 
Md. 681, 715-16, 742-44 (Wilner J., concurring, joined by Battaglia and Greene, JJ.) (expressing 
view similar to Prof. Raeder‘s: ―outside the realm of excited or spontaneous utterances or 
statutory admissibility,‖ hearsay is inadmissible if the declarant – here an 18-month-old child – 
would have been incompetent to testify). 
 
 The trial court in Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 825 (1990), ―implicitly‖ had found the 
young out-of-court declarant, ―at the time she made the statements, . . . capable of receiving just 
impressions of the facts and of relating them truly.‖  The United States Supreme Court held: 
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[T]he Confrontation Clause does not erect a per se rule banning the admission of 
prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the 
time of trial.  Although such inability might be relevant to whether the earlier 
hearsay statement possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness, a per se 
rule of exclusion would not only frustrate the truth-seeking purpose of the 
Confrontation Clause, but would also hinder States in their own ―enlightened 
development in the law of evidence.‖ 
 
Id. (citations omitted).  See Swan v. Peterson, 6 F.3d 1373, 1381-82 (9th Cir. 1993) (state court 
committed no error in admitting, under tender years exception, out-of-court statement of young 
child who was incompetent to testify at trial); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945-48 (4th 
Cir. 1988) (excited utterances by alleged child sexual abuse victim to her mother were 
admissible, regardless whether child was competent to testify at trial); Myatt v. Hannigan, 910 
F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1990) (Kansas statute did not violate confrontation clause, nor did admission 
of ―unqualified‖ child‘s reliable out-of-court statements to social worker and police officer; 
psychiatrist had testified that child knew difference between right and wrong and that his 
statements were reliable); People v. District Court of El Paso County, 776 P.2d 1083, 1087 
(Colo. 1989); Perez v. State, 536 So.2d 206, 211 (Fla. 1989); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335, 
1341 (Ill.Ct.App. 1989); Miller v. State, 517 N.E.2d 64, 72 n.7 (Ind. 1987); State v. Bobadilla, 
709 N.W.2d 243, 248, 256 (Minn. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 943 (2006) (child does not have 
to be competent to testify at trial in order for his statement to be admitted under the Minnesota 
―tender years‖ hearsay exception), habeas corpus granted on other ground, 570 F.Supp.2d 1098 
(D. Minn. 2008); State v. Campbell, 705 P.2d 694, 703-06 (Or. 1985) (if trial court holds 
competency hearing and finds alleged victim of child abuse incompetent to testify, child‘s out-
of-court statements may be admitted under hearsay exception for complaints of sexual 
misconduct); State v. C.J., 63 P.2d 765 (Wash. 2003) (statement admissible under tender years 
statute); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash.App. 2005), review denied, 132 P.2d 147 (Wash. 
2006); Jon R. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay: 
Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 879 (1981).   
 
 This result takes into account principles of developmental psychology.  A child of a 
certain age may be able to accurately relate very recent events but not events of a long time ago.  
(An Alzheimer‘s patient might have the opposite capacity.)  Excited utterances of young children 
have often been admitted, though the children would not have been permitted to testify in court.  
E.g., State v. Giles, 772 P.2d 191 (Idaho 1989); Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 561, 338 A.2d 
344, 347 (1975) (excited utterance of 3-1/2-year-old child was admissible; child‘s competence is 
―irrelevant since the testimonial qualifications do not apply to spontaneous declarations‖).   
 
 If, however, the statement was made by a person who is shown to have lacked sufficient 
mental capacity to have made any rational statement at the time the statement was made, the 
court should exclude the statement.  See United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 
1993) (―Another factor to consider in determining whether [the child victim‘s] hearsay 
statements contain particularized guarantees of trustworthiness is the reason for [the child‘s] 
inability to testify at trial.  While the Confrontation Clause ‗does not erect a per se rule barring 
the admission of prior statements of a declarant who is unable to communicate to the jury at the 
time of trial,‘ the declarant‘s inability to communicate may be relevant to whether the hearsay 
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statements possessed particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.  Should the district court 
determine that [the child] did not know the difference between the truth and a lie, this finding 
would have an obvious impact on whether [her] hearsay statements were trustworthy.‖); Ring v. 
Erickson, 983 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1992) (admission of videotaped interviews of 3-year-old child 
victim, whom state court determined to be incompetent to testify at trial, not shown to have 
adequate indicia of reliability, was violation of accused‘s confrontation right and reversible 
error); Hutchcraft v. Roberts, 809 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1992) (state court violated defendant‘s 
confrontation rights by admitting out-of-court statements of mentally retarded teenaged victim 
when, inter alia, preliminary hearing judge found declarant unavailable to testify on ground that 
she could not discern the truth from falsehood); State v. Karpenski, 971 P.2d 553 (Wash. App. 
Div. 2 1999) (child victim was neither competent to testify at trial nor competent when he made 
numerous inconsistent and fantastic out-of-court statements; reversible error to permit child to 
testify and to admit his out-of-court statements).  See also Miller v. State, 531 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. 
1988) (under all circumstances, including use of leading questions, reversible error to admit 
unreliable statement). 
 
IV. Crawford’s Reframing of the Confrontation Clause Analysis 
 
 A. In General 
 
 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 
(2006), establish that the confrontation clause applies only to ―testimonial‖ hearsay offered by 
the prosecution.  Such evidence may be received only under one of three scenarios:
3
  either  
 
  1. The accused has forfeited his or her confrontation right by engaging in 
wrongdoing (directly or in a conspiracy) that was intended to and did 
cause the declarant to be unavailable to testify (proof of the wrongdoing 
may be difficult to achieve without the cooperation of an intimidated 
witness, however); see Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. 2678 (U.S. 2008); or 
 
  2. The declarant is unavailable to testify at trial (see Md. Rule 5-804(a)) 
and the accused has earlier (e.g., at a preliminary hearing) had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about his or her statement 
that is now being offered into evidence; or 
 
  3. The out-of-court declarant who made the testimonial hearsay 
statement testifies at the trial, so that the accused has an opportunity to 
cross-examine the declarant at trial, Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9; Lawson 
v. State, 389 Md. 570, 587-89, 886 A.2d 876 (2005). 
 
 If a statement helpful to the prosecution is ―testimonial,‖ and neither of the first two 
scenarios has been met, Crawford and Davis maximize the prosecution‘s incentives to do 
                                                 
3   Crawford suggests, however, that even testimonial dying declarations may not be excluded by the confrontation 
clause, because they were admissible under the common law of 1791.  541 U.S. at 56 n.6. 
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everything possible to have the declarant testify at trial.  There are, however, practical 
impediments to achieving this goal: 
 
  1. Child abuse victims who are very young may be found to be unqualified to 
testify at trial; 
 
  2. Parents or guardians may not wish to permit the prosecution to expose 
children to the stress of trial; 
 
  3. Child or adult witnesses may be unwilling to testify, for fear of retaliation; 
and 
 
  4. Some domestic violence victims may be entitled to invoke a marital 
privilege not to testify.
4
   
 
 If the hearsay statement is “nontestimonial,” the confrontation clause does not apply 
to its admission.  Davis v. Washington.  The only constitutional check will be the due process 
clause, under which a verdict that was based on unreliable hearsay would be constitutionally 
unsound.  As to what is “reliable” we can still look to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), for 
this due process purpose. 
 
 B. In Determining Whether a Statement is Testimonial, Does It Matter that the 
Declarant Was a Child? 
 
 Although this particular argument of his has not yet gained traction with the courts, 
Professor Richard Friedman has argued that Avery young children@ are too young Ato be deemed 
a witness@ within the meaning of the confrontation clause, whether because of Acognitive@ 
reasons or because incapable of understanding Amaking a choice to testify,@ and their out-of-court 
utterances should be admitted Afor what they are worth, without pretending that the children have 
the capacity to act like adults.@  Richard D. Friedman, The Conundrum of Children, 
Confrontation, and Hearsay, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 251-52 & n.4 (No. 1, Winter 2002).  
Thus, he concludes that statements by an eighteen-month-old and a two-and-a-half-year-old 
would probably not be testimonial.  Id. at 249. 
 
 But in Crawford and Davis, Justice Scalia repeatedly asserts that the test for ―testimony‖ 
turns on what an ―objective‖ declarant would think.5  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52; Davis, 547 U.S. 
813, 822, 826, 827, 828, 830 & n.5 (2006).  His “objective” test does not seem to leave room for 
the lower courts to focus on the declarant‘s youth.  In Snowden v. State, 385 Md. 64, 90-91, 867 
A.2d 314, 329 (2005), the court adopted the view that the operable test was one ―using an 
objective person, rather than an objective child of that age.‖  Accord State v. Henderson, 129 
                                                 
4  Such a refusal is likely to adversely affect children of the marriage, as ―domestic violence and child mistreatment, 
problems are often intertwined. . . .‖   Note, Caught between a Rock and a Hard Place: Harmonizing Victim 
Confidentiality Rights with Children‟s Best Interests, 70 MO. L. REV. 863, 863 (2005). 
 
5   Justice Scalia‘s dictum regarding White v. Illinois supports this conclusion.  See text following note 6 infra. 
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P.3d 646 (Kan. App. 2006), aff‟d, 165 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2007).  Contra People v. Stechly, 879 
N.E.2d 333, 366 (Ill. 2007) (plurality decision) (age of child declarant is one factor to consider 
with regard to whether her statement to her mother on way to hospital was testimonial). 
 
 C. What Did Crawford and Davis Hold as to Whether a Statement is Testimonial or 
Nontestimonial? 
 
 Crawford finds the Sixth Amendment unclear on its face and therefore looks to the 
founders‘ intent when the Amendment was ratified in 1791.  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
concludes that the founders were concerned that we not repeat a practice that had occurred 
during ―Bloody Mary‘s‖ reign in England where — following the civil law practice rather than 
the common law‘s approach — justices of the peace gathered ex parte statements from witnesses 
and later these were offered into evidence at some trials, without the accused being given a 
chance to cross-examine the makers of the statements. 
 
 Justice Scalia remarks, ―The involvement of government officers in the production of 
testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the 
peace.‖  He reasons that ―witnesses are those who bear testimony,‖ but declines to articulate a 
definition of ―testimonial.‖  Crawford explicitly states that the following are testimonial under 
any definition: 
 
 (1) ―ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing‖; 
 (2) ―plea allocution‖; 
 (3) ―grand jury testimony‖; 
 (4) prior trial testimony; and 
 (5) ―[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations. . . .‖6 
 
In Davis, again in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court holds: 
 
Without attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable 
statements—or even all conceivable statements in response to police 
interrogation—as either testimonial or nontestimonial, it suffices to decide the 
                                                 
6 The Crawford Court explained in its footnote 4 that it declined to define interrogation: 
 
We use the term ―interrogation‖ in its colloquial, rather than any technical legal, 
sense.  Cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 
L.$Ed.2d 297 (1980).  Just as various definitions of ―testimonial‖ exist, one can 
imagine various definitions of ―interrogation,‖ and we need not select among 
them in this case.  Sylvia‘s recorded statement, knowingly given in response to 
structured police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition. 
 
 In footnote 1 in Davis, the Court qualified its reference to interrogation as follows:  ―This is not to imply, 
however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.  The Framers 
were no more willing to exempt from cross-examination volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions 
than they were to exempt answers to detailed interrogation.‖ 
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present cases to hold as follows:  Statements are nontestimonial when made in 
the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the circumstances 
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. 
 
Davis involved two cases.  In Davis itself, the Court held that the victim‘s statements during the 
beginning moments of a 911 call [e.g., ―He‘s here jumpin‘ on me again.‖] were nontestimonial: 
 
The statements in Davis were taken when McCottry was alone, not only 
unprotected by police, but apparently in immediate danger from Davis.  She was 
seeking aid, not telling a story about the past.  McCottry‘s present-tense 
statements showed immediacy. 
 
* * * 
 
In Davis, McCottry was speaking about events as they were actually happening, 
rather than ―describ[ing] past events.‖  *  *  *  Moreover, any reasonable listener 
would recognize that McCottry . . . was facing an ongoing emergency.  
Although one might call 911 to provide a narrative report of a crime absent any 
imminent danger, McCottry‘s call was plainly a call for help against bona fide 
physical threat.  Third, the nature of what was asked and answered in Davis, again 
viewed objectively, was such that the elicited statements were necessary to be 
able to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn (as in 
Crawford) what had happened in the past.  That is true even of the operator‘s 
effort to establish the identity of the assailant, so that the dispatched officers 
might know whether they would be encountering a violent felon.  And finally, the 
difference in the level of formality between the two interviews is striking.  
Crawford[‗s wife] was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of 
questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers:  
McCottry‘s frantic answers were provided over the phone, in an environment that 
was not tranquil, or even (as far as any reasonable 911 operator could make out) 
safe. 
 
We conclude from all this that the circumstances of McCottry‘s interrogation 
objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.  She simply was not acting as a witness; she was not 
testifying. * * * 
 
This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation to 
determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana Supreme 
Court put it, “evolve into testimonial statements,” once that purpose has 
been achieved.  In this case, for example, after the operator gained the 
information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency 
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appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises).  The operator 
then told McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions.  It 
could readily be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry‘s statements were 
testimonial, not unlike the ―structured police questioning‖ that occurred in 
Crawford.  This presents no great problem.  Just as, for Fifth Amendment 
purposes, ―police officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between 
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and 
questions designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect,‖ trial 
courts will recognize the point at which, for Sixth Amendment purposes, 
statements in response to interrogations become testimonial.  Through in limine 
procedure, they should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have 
become testimonial, as they do, for example, with unduly prejudicial portions of 
otherwise admissible evidence. 
 
 On the other hand, it held that in the companion case of Hammon v. Indiana, the 
domestic violence victim‘s (1) oral statements to the responding police, in answer to their 
questions and (2) her affidavit signed at the scene were both testimonial.  Justice Scalia analyzed 
the statements to the responding police as follows: 
 
It is entirely clear from the circumstances [in Hammon] that the interrogation was 
part of an investigation into possibly criminal past conduct—as, indeed, the 
testifying officer expressly acknowledged.  There was no emergency in 
progress; the interrogating officer testified that he had heard no arguments or 
crashing and saw no one throw or break anything.  When the officers first arrived, 
Amy told them that things were fine, and there was no immediate threat to her 
person.  When the officer questioned Amy for the second time, and elicited the 
challenged statements, he was not seeking to determine (as in Davis) ―what is 
happening,‖ but rather ―what happened.‖  Objectively viewed, the primary, if 
not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible 
crime. . . .
7
 
                                                 
7 Justice Thomas roundly criticized the Court for failing to provide a workable standard for distinguishing between 
testimonial and nontestimonial statements: 
 
In many, if not most, cases where police respond to a report of a crime, whether pursuant 
to a 911 call from the victim or otherwise, the purposes of an interrogation, viewed from 
the perspective of the police, are both to respond to the emergency situation and to gather 
evidence.  See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984) (―Undoubtedly most 
police officers [deciding whether to give Miranda warnings in a possible emergency 
situation] would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable 
motives—their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as well the desire to obtain 
incriminating evidence from the suspect‖).  Assigning one of these two ―largely 
unverifiable motives,‖ primacy requires constructing a hierarchy of purpose that will 
rarely be present—and is not reliably discernible.  It will inevitably be, quite simply, an 
exercise in fiction. * * * [T]he fact that the officer in Hammon was investigating Mr. 
Hammon‘s past conduct does not foreclose the possibility that the primary purpose of his 
inquiry was to assess whether Mr. Hammon constituted a continuing danger to his wife, 
requiring further police presence or action.  It is hardly remarkable that Hammon did not 
act abusively towards his wife in the presence of the officers, and his good judgment to 
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 * * * It was formal enough that Amy‘s interrogation was conducted in a 
separate room, away from her husband (who tried to intervene), with the officer 
receiving her replies for use in his ―investigat[ion].‖  * * * Both declarants 
[Hammon‘s wife, Amy, and Crawford‘s wife, Sylvia] were actively separated 
from the defendant—officers forcibly prevented Hershel from participating in the 
interrogation.  Both statements deliberately recounted, in response to police 
questioning, how potentially criminal past events began and progressed.  And 
both took place some time after the events described were over.  Such statements 
under official interrogation are an obvious substitute for live testimony, because 
they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination; they are inherently 
testimonial. 
 
* * * Amy‘s narrative of past events was delivered at some remove in time from 
the danger she described.  And after Amy answered the officers‘ questions, he had 
her execute an affidavit, in order, he testified, ―[t]o establish events that have 
occurred previously.‖ 
 
 In extending ―testimonial‖ to responses to at least some responses to initial police 
inquiries in the field,
8
 the Davis court went beyond ―formalized testimony or its equivalent‖ and 
thus lost the vote of Justice Thomas. 
 
 See State v. Lucas, 407 Md. 307, 965 A.2d 75 (2009) (excited statements by an assault 
victim, at the scene—in answer to the responding officer‘s questions, after telling the victim that 
he was ―there for an investigation,‖ asking ― ‗what happened‘ ‖ and ― ‗where she got the 
marks‘ ‖—that defendant had kicked her and grabbed her around her neck were testimonial; the 
defendant was outside the victim‘s apartment, sitting on some steps; Judge Adkins, writing for a 
unanimous court, distinguished the case ―from those in which officers encountered victims with 
apparent severe injuries requiring immediate medical attention and/or where an assailant had not 
yet been located‖). 
                                                                                                                                                             
refrain from criminal behavior in the presence of police sheds little, if any, light on 
whether his violence would have resumed had the police left without further questioning, 
transforming what the Court dismisses as ―past conduct‖ back into an ―ongoing 
emergency.‖ 
 
Davis v. Washington, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2283-85 (U.S. 2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and 
dissenting in part). 
8 The Davis court explained: 
 
Although we necessarily reject the Indiana Supreme Court‘s implication that virtually any ―initial 
inquiries‖ at the crime scene will not be testimonial, we do not hold the opposite—that no questions at the 
scene will yield nontestimonial answers.  We have already observed of domestic disputes that ―[o]fficers 
called to investigate . . . need to know whom they are dealing with in order to assess the situation, the threat 
to their own safety, and possible danger to the potential victim.‖  Hiibel, 542 U.S. at 186, 124 S.Ct. 2451.  
Such exigencies may often mean that “initial inquiries” produce nontestimonial statements.  But in 
cases like this one, where Amy‘s statements were neither a cry for help nor the provision of information 
enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation, the fact that they were given at an alleged 
crime scene and were ―initial inquiries‖ is immaterial. 
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 D. What of Statements Not Made During Interrogation by the Police or an Agent of 
the Police? 
 
  1. Elicitation by Police or Their Agents 
 
 Justice Scalia, writing for the Crawford Court, concluded that the founders were 
concerned that we not repeat a practice that had occurred during ABloody Mary=s@ reign in 
England where justices of the peace gathered ex parte statements from witnesses, and these were 
later offered into evidence without the accused‘s being given a chance to cross-examine the 
declarants.  He remarked, AThe involvement of government officers in the production of 
testimonial evidence presents the same risk, whether the officers are police or justices of the 
peace.@  541 U.S. at 53.  Crawford thus included as testimonial not only in-court testimony but 
also statements made in response to police interrogation. 
 
 In Crawford the statement in question was made in response to police interrogation at the 
station house.  In Davis the Court expanded the definition to include some statements elicited by 
police at a crime scene as well as some elicited by 911 operators; it explicitly assumed that 911 
operators are ―law enforcement personnel,‖ agents of the police.  547 U.S. at 817, 822, 823 n.2. 
 
 Lower courts also have found statements to be testimonial when elicited by agents of the 
police.  E.g., Snowden, 385 Md. at 84-88, 867 A.2d at 317, 325-27 (social worker, who 
interviewed child victims Aat a County-owned and operated facility unfamiliar to the children and 
used for the purpose of investigating and assessing victims of child abuse,@ with a police 
detective present in the room, and after a suspect had been identified; moreover, each child had 
stated that ―she was aware that she was being interviewed as a result of her accusations against 
[the defendant]‖).  See also Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F.Supp.2d 1098 (D. Minn. 2008) (granting 
habeas relief on ground state court unreasonably held child‘s videotaped statement to a social 
worker in presence of a police officer was nontestimonial). 
 
 Both Crawford and Davis involved situations where the declarant knew she was 
speaking to police or their agents.  Dictum in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58, distinguished from the 
case before it Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181-84 (1987), which had upheld the 
admission of statements made unwittingly to an FBI informant. . . .‖  Of course, the Bourjaily 
statements were statements by a coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, which 
by definition were not intentionally made to the government.  But the dictum indicates that the 
government‘s involvement alone is insufficient to make a speaker‘s statement testimonial. 
 
  2. Statements to Others 
 
 Again in dictum, the Crawford majority opinion states:  A[N]ot all hearsay implicates the 
Sixth Amendment=s core concerns.  An off-hand, overheard remark bears little resemblance to 
the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. . . .  An accuser who makes a formal 
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes a casual 
remark to an acquaintance does not.@  541 U.S. at 51.  Lower courts have fastened on to these 
comments and have routinely held statements to friends and family members to be 
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nontestimonial.  See, e.g., State v. Hosty, 944 So.2d 255 (Fla. 2006) (Florida‘s statutory hearsay 
exception for reliable statements by ―an elderly person or disabled adult‖ as to his or her having 
been abused, neglected, etc., is unconstitutional as to testimonial statements only; here, initial 
statements by mentally retarded adult woman, to her teacher, were nontestimonial). 
 
  3. Less Formal, More Spontaneous Statements 
 
 Some courts have also found more spontaneous statements, not produced by formal 
interrogation, to be nontestimonial.  See, e.g., State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008) (3-year-
old‘s blurted statement to his mother, that ―Daddy beats me,‖ was nontestimonial); People v. 
Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. App. 2004), appeal denied, 688 N.W.2d 829 (Mich. 2004) (2-
year-old child‘s answer to question by non-government employee, director of Children‘s 
Assessment Center, upon seeing blood in child‘s ―pull-up,‖ after accompanying child to 
bathroom, as to whether child had ―an owie,‖ was nontestimonial). 
 
 But Davis explicitly cautions that ―statements made in the absence of any interrogation 
are [not] necessarily nontestimonial,‖ and that the confrontation clause will cover ―volunteered 
testimony.‖  547 U.S. at 822 n.1. 
 
V. Excited Utterances 
 
 A. Are Excited Utterances Testimonial? 
 
  1. Crawford Cast Doubt on White v. Illinois 
 
 Before Crawford, excited utterances
9 
by children were freely admitted against criminal 
defendants, even when the children did not testify.  E.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).  
In Crawford, however, Justice Scalia commented:  ―One case arguably in tension with the 
[Crawford] rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-examination when the proffered 
statement is testimonial is White v. Illinois, which involved, inter alia, statements of a child 
victim to an investigating police officer admitted as spontaneous declarations.‖  541 U.S. at 58 
n.8.  His remark indicated that White‘s precedential value was in question. 
 
 The events at issue in White began when a 4-year-old screamed in the middle of the 
night.  Her babysitter ran to the child‘s second floor bedroom.  On her way there, she saw the 
defendant emerge from the bedroom and leave the house.  The child told the babysitter that the 
defendant had ―put his hand over her mouth, choked her, threatened to whip her if she screamed 
                                                 
9   FRE 803(2) codifies the common law hearsay exception for out-of-court statements ―relating to a startling event 
or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.‖  
Although there is empirical evidence that excitement impairs perception, the excitement caused by the event is 
thought to still reflection, so as to preclude deliberate prevarication.  The requirement that the declarant remain 
under the stress of the exciting event up until and including the time of the statement is believed to prevent the 
fading of memory.  The hearsay exception was recognized because of the enhanced likelihood of sincerity, the 
guarantee of perception, and the lack of memory problems.  Under the evidence rules, excited utterances are 
admissible regardless whether the declarant is available to testify. 
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and had ‗touch[ed] her in the wrong places,‘ ‖ and when asked where, pointed to her vaginal 
area.  502 U.S. at 349. 
 
 The babysitter telephoned the child‘s mother.  When the mother returned home, the child 
told the mother the same thing, but added another detail.  The mother called the police.  Forty-
five minutes after the child had screamed, a police officer arrived and talked with the four-year-
old at the family‘s kitchen table.  Id. at 349-50.  The Illinois court found, and the United States 
Supreme Court assumed, that the child‘s statements to her babysitter, her mother, and the police 
officer qualified as ―spontaneous declarations‖ of the type referred to as excited utterances.  The 
people who heard the child‘s statements testified to them at trial; the child did not testify. 
 
 The question on which certiorari was granted in White was whether the confrontation 
clause required that the child declarant be either produced at trial or found to be unavailable to 
testify before her excited utterances (as well as her subsequent statements made to a physician 
for the purpose of obtaining medical diagnosis or treatment) could be proved.  Id. at 348-51 & 
n.2.  The Court‘s majority, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that no showing of 
unavailability was required, and that the admission of the evidence did not impinge upon the 
defendant‘s confrontation right.  Id. at 354-55 & n.6. 
 
 The White court also held that the confrontation clause analysis applied to all hearsay 
evidence and rejected the government‟s argument that the confrontation clause did not apply, 
because the child‘s statement was not an ex parte affidavit, deposition, or confession.  Id. at 352 
n.5.  Justice Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Scalia, 
would have embraced the government‘s argument to some degree.  But, intriguingly (given 
subsequent developments in Crawford and Davis), the concurring opinion criticized the 
government‘s proposed test as possibly being ―difficult to apply‖ and overbroad, on the ground 
that it might have included the victim‘s statement to the investigating officer.10 
                                                 
10  If not carefully formulated, however, the approach might be difficult to apply and might develop 
in a manner not entirely consistent with the crucial ―witnesses against him‖ phrase.  In this case, 
for example, the victim‟s statements to the investigating police officer might be considered the 
functional equivalent of in-court testimony because the statements arguably were made in 
contemplation of legal proceedings.  Attempts to draw a line between statements made in 
contemplation of legal proceedings and those not so made would entangle the courts in a 
multitude of difficulties.  Few types of statements could be categorically characterized within or 
without the reach of a defendant‘s confrontation rights.  Not even statements made to the police or 
government officials could be deemed automatically subject to the right of confrontation (imagine 
a victim who blurts out an accusation to a passing police officer, or the unsuspecting social-
services worker who is told of possible child abuse).  It is also not clear under the United States‟ 
approach whether the declarant or the listener (or both) must be contemplating legal proceedings. 
* * *  I believe it is possible to interpret the Confrontation Clause along the lines suggested by the 
United States in a manner that is faithful to both the provision‘s text and history.  One possible 
formulation is as follows:  The federal constitutional right of confrontation extends to any witness 
who actually testifies at trial, but the Confrontation Clause is implicated by extrajudicial 
statements only insofar as they are contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. 
 
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. at 364-65 (Thomas, J., concurring in the result and concurring in the judgment, joined by 
Scalia, J.) (emphasis added). 
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 Justice Scalia‘s dictum in Crawford suggested that he had changed his view to one that 
would include at least the child‘s kitchen table statements to the police officer as within the reach 
of the confrontation clause.   
 
  2. Davis 
 
 The Davis majority, again in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, threaded the needle 
by holding that Amy Hammon‘s statements to responding police at the scene of domestic 
violence were testimonial, because the circumstances ―objectively indicate[d] that there [was] no 
. . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖  547 U.S. at 822. 
 
 On the other hand, the Court held that Michelle McCottry‘s initial statements to a 911 
operator were nontestimonial, because they were made ―under circumstances objectively 
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet 
an ongoing emergency.‖  Id.  Justice Scalia reasoned, ―The statements in Davis were taken when 
McCottry was alone, not only unprotected by police, but apparently in immediate danger from 
Davis.  She was seeking aid, not telling a story about the past.  McCottry‘s present-tense 
statements [‗He‘s here jumpin‘ on me again.‘] showed immediacy.‖  Id. at 817, 831. 
 
 In dictum he implied that once the immediate emergency was over, the victim‘s 
statements became testimonial: 
 
 This is not to say that a conversation which begins as an interrogation 
to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot, as the Indiana 
Supreme Court put it, Aevolve into testimonial statements,@ once that purpose 
has been achieved.  In this case, for example, after the operator gained the 
information needed to address the exigency of the moment, the emergency 
appears to have ended (when Davis drove away from the premises).  The operator 
then told McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to pose a battery of questions.  It 
could readily be maintained that, from that point on, McCottry=s statements were 
testimonial, not unlike the Astructured police questioning@ that occurred in 
Crawford.   
 
Id. at 828-29.  Compare Marquardt v. State, 164 Md. App. 95, 121-22, 127-28, 882 A.2d 900 
(2005) (an assault victim called 911 on her cell phone and it was left on during the assault; her 
pleas to the defendant during the assault, which were recorded by the 911 facility, were 
nontestimonial; her subsequent statements made to an investigating officer at the hospital were 
testimonial), cert. denied, 390 Md. 91, 887 A.2d 656 (2005). 
 
  3. Excited Utterances to Persons Not Law Enforcement Agents 
 
 Post-Crawford, the lower courts have found excited utterances to persons other than 
police or their agents to be nontestimonial.  E.g., People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 927-29 (Colo. 
2006) (7-year-old child‘s excited statements to his father and his father‘s friends, immediately 
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after sexual assault, were nontestimonial); Wallace v. State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2005) (victim‘s statements to EMT and emergency room nurse as to who shot him were 
nontestimonial excited utterances and dying declarations). 
 
 B. Application of Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2) in the Context of Child Declarants 
 
 A child‘s utterances made while the child remains under the continuous stress of an 
exciting event will qualify under Md. Rule 5-803(b)(2) and its federal and other state 
counterparts.  E.g., United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1994) (13-year-old‘s 
statement made 20 minutes after witnessing beating qualified); Harmony v. State, 88 Md. App. 
306, 317-21, 594 A.2d 1182, 1187-89 (1991) (no abuse of discretion in admission of evidence as 
excited utterance, when foundational evidence supported finding that the statement, a telephone 
call by a crying 14-year-old girl to her sister, relating sexual abuse by their uncle that had 
occurred that evening, was uttered spontaneously, so that she was incapable of ―forethought or 
deliberate design‖); Moore v. State, 26 Md. App. 556, 561-67, 338 A.2d 344, 347-49 (1975) (no 
abuse of discretion to admit statement by 3½-year-old child that ― ‗Daddy was mad, Daddy did 
it,‘ ‖ made to physician in response to question, within hours after alleged beating that inflicted 
massive injuries). 
 
 The courts take into consideration the youth of the declarant in ascertaining whether the 
stress continued, unabated.  E.g., Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945-48 (4th Cir. 1988) (over 
years from 2½ to 4-years-old); United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83, 85-86 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(9-year-old who had been sexually assaulted). 
 
 Often, however, child victims‘ statements do not even qualify under the evidence rule, as 
children frequently do not disclose close enough in time to the event at issue.  See Knapp v. 
White, 296 F.Supp.2d 766, 778 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (not improper for police officer to give expert 
testimony, based on past experience in similar cases, that ―children often delay reporting sexual 
abuse‖). 
 
 If they disclose only upon a second event that brings the earlier startling event to mind, 
the requisite unbroken stress and the circumstantial guarantee of no memory problem
11
 are 
arguably missing.  See Harnish v. State, 9 Md. App. 546, 266 A.2d 364 (1970) (reversing 
conviction because mother of 5-year-old sexual abuse victim was permitted to testify as to what 
child said to her -- after accused came over and asked her to send child to his home -- regarding 
incident which had occurred 11 days earlier).  Contra, e.g., United States v. Lossiah, 129 Fed. 
Appx. 434 (10th Cir. 2005) (unpublished), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 954 (2005) (child under 
twelve‘s statement, upon seeing defendant arrive at school, ―Don‘t let him check me out.  He 
raped me [on some earlier date].‖ was properly admitted as an excited utterance); State v. 
Fowler, 500 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio App. 1985) (14-year-old child‘s seeing television program about 
incest was a startling event, so that her spontaneous statements, when found hiding in a 
cubbyhole in a friend‘s home, about sexual abuse committed on her the night before, and for 
years earlier, were properly admitted).  In Fowler the statements were to police officers who 
                                                 
11   See supra note 6. 
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were looking for her, one hour after she had been reported missing by her mother and stepfather, 
and in response to a question as to why she had run away.   
 
 Query:  Even if qualifying as excited utterances, were the statements in Fowler 
testimonial? 
 
VI. Statements Made in Seeking Medical Diagnosis or Treatment 
 
 A. Qualifying Statements under the Hearsay Exception of Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) 
 
 By virtue of Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4), the hearsay rule does not exclude those parts of 
statements made by a person who is seeking “medical treatment or medical diagnosis in 
contemplation of treatment,” when they ―describ[e] medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external 
sources thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to treatment or diagnosis in contemplation of 
treatment.‖  A circumstantial guarantee of the declarant‘s sincerity is present only when the 
declarant seeks medical treatment or diagnosis in order to determine whether medical treatment 
is necessary.
12
 
 
 The courts have required a foundational showing, then, of two components:  ―first, is the 
declarant‘s motive consistent with the purpose of the rule; and second, is it reasonable for the 
physician to rely on the information in diagnosis or treatment.‖ Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 84. 
 
  1. Declarant‘s Motive: Requisite Understanding of Medical Relevance 
 
 The evidence must support a Md. Rule 5-104(a) finding by the court that the declarant 
understood that her being given appropriate medical care turned on her being completely 
accurate in her statements to the hearer.  This standard was held to have been met, for example, 
in In re Rachel T., 77 Md. App. 20, 549 A.2d 27 (1988) (child was almost 5 years old, and, inter 
alia, she had been told by physician that the questions asked of her were to determine why she 
had had vaginal bleeding). 
 
 But many courts have found the required showing lacking when the declarant is a very 
young child.  E.g., United States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 739 (8th Cir. 2001) (no evidence 
that 3-year-and-10-month-old child ―understood the medical significance of being truthful‖); 
Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 666 (1988) (2-year-old declarant was ―not mature 
enough to appreciate the critical cause-and-effect connections between accurate information, 
correct medical diagnosis, and efficacious medical treatment‖).  See United States v. Sumner, 
204 F.3d 1182 (8th Cir. 2000) (reversible error to admit evidence of 6-year-old victim‘s 
statements to clinical psychologist, where although psychologist explained to victim that he was 
doctor, he did not discuss need for truthfulness with her or emphasize that identification of her 
abuser was important in his attempts to help her; there was no clear evidence that victim had 
                                                 
12   Maryland codified the common law hearsay exception, which is unavailable when the declarant consults a 
physician for other purposes, such as diagnosis (or evaluation) not intended to lead to possible treatment, which is 
the case when the declarant speaks with the physician solely to prepare the doctor to testify as an expert witness.  
See Low v. State, 119 Md. App. 413, 705 A.2d 67 (1998).   
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been taken to psychologist for medical diagnosis or treatment; and victim told subsequent 
therapist that she saw psychologist just to talk).  Cf. Rex v. Pike, 3 Car. & Payne 598 (Assizes 
1829) (4-year-old child‘s dying declaration was inadmissible, because she was too young to have 
been ―under the deep impression that [she] was soon to render an account to [her] Maker‖). 
 
  2. Statements Must Be ―Reasonably Pertinent to Diagnosis or Treatment‖ 
 
 The second component for admissibility is relevance of the information disclosed to 
―medical diagnosis or treatment.‖  Two questions have arisen repeatedly in this context:  (1) does 
―medical‖ include psychological? and (2) is the identity of an alleged perpetrator ―pertinent‖ to 
diagnosis or treatment? 
 
   a. Psychological Diagnosis or Treatment 
 
  Sometimes the hearer of statements relevant to the patient‘s emotional distress is a 
medical doctor, in which event the courts seem to easily find medical relevance.  E.g., 
Willingham v. Crooke, 412 F.3d 553, 561-62 (4th Cir. 2005) (abuse of discretion to exclude § 
1983 plaintiff‘s statements to her physician reporting her anxiety due to police misconduct, on 
ground that they did not sufficiently relate to her physical condition; their relevance to her 
emotional trauma, for which she was seeking medical treatment, sufficed); United States v. 
Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 89 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant‘s statements to his psychiatrist were 
admissible under Fed. R. Evid. (―FRE‖) 803(4)). 
 
 Whether statements to a psychologist or clinical social worker qualify as regarding 
―medical‖ treatment has caused more difficulty, though many courts have held that the Rule 
applies.  E.g., Davignon v. Clemmey, 322 F.3d 1, 8 & n.3 (1st Cir. 2003) (no plain error to admit 
intentional infliction-of-emotional-distress plaintiff‘s statement to a family therapist who was 
social worker); Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 808 (9th Cir. 2001) (no abuse of 
discretion in admitting, in racial harassment suit, psychologists‘ medical history summaries 
regarding period after plaintiff had left his job); United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438,1442 (8th 
Cir. 1994) (FRE 803(4) embraces statements made for psychological diagnosis); Morgan v. 
Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948-50 (4th Cir. 1988) (error to exclude statements made by alleged 
child sexual abuse victim to her psychologist for purposes of diagnosis or treatment) (retired 
Justice Powell dissented on this point, and would have merely had the trial court reconsider it at 
retrial).  See United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (FRE 803(4) 
applies to statements made to clinical psychologist) (dictum); John J. Capowski, An 
Interdisciplinary Analysis of Statements to Mental Health Professionals under the Diagnosis or 
Treatment Hearsay Exception, 33 GA. L. REV. 353, 411 (1999) (arguing that such statements 
should qualify). 
 
25 
 
   b. Identity of the Culprit 
 
 Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) contemplates only the admission of those parts of statements 
pertinent to medical diagnosis or treatment, and the corollary federal Advisory Committee note 
explains that generally statements regarding fault will not fall within the hearsay exception. 
 
 If the health professional needed to know the source of an injury in order to determine 
treatment (for example, to determine what antidote was needed for a poison), the patient‘s 
statement as to source should be admissible -- particularly if the doctor told the patient that the 
information was necessary for proper treatment.  See United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 
289 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (patient‘s statement as to who gave him an injection -- though doctor 
testified that it was necessary to find out that person‘s identity so as to learn what medication had 
been injected, so as to determine what treatment was required -- was not admissible under FRE 
803(4), since it was not clear that patient was told this, so patient‘s motivation may not have 
been to aid in diagnosis or treatment). 
 
 Although the cases are not unanimous, many courts have concluded that the identity of a 
child‘s abuser is pertinent to the child‘s medical treatment.  E.g., United States v. Bercier, 506 
F.3d 625, 632-33 (8th Cir. 2007) (―Such statements may be admissible if the identity of the 
abuser is relevant to treating the victim‘s emotional or psychological injuries.  But the 
government must demonstrate that (i) the physician made clear to the victim that inquiry into the 
abuser‟s identity was essential to diagnosis and treatment, and (ii) „the victim manifest[ed] such 
an understanding.‖) (emphasis added); United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 n.3 
(10th Cir. 2000) (in Tenth Circuit, there is no requirement that physician first explain to child 
that identity of abuser is important for child‘s treatment); United States v. Tome, 61 F.3d 1446, 
1449-51 (10th Cir. 1995) (identification of assailant is admissible when made by victim of 
domestic sexual abuse) (over partial dissent), rev‘d on other grounds, 513 U.S. 150 (1995); 
United States v. Yazzie, 59 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1995) (mother‘s out-of-court statements to doctor 
for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment of child for sexual abuse, which identified 
defendant stepfather as perpetrator, were admissible under medical treatment exception to 
hearsay rule); United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 578-80 (8th Cir. 1992) (child victim‘s 
statements to medical doctor, social worker, and psychologists were admissible under FRE 
803(4); identification of abuser was pertinent to doctor‘s recommendation for counseling and to 
others‘ diagnosis and treatment of child‘s emotional and psychological injuries; moreover, child 
testified at trial and was subject to meaningful cross-examination, so that there could be no 
violation of the confrontation clause); United States v. Provost, 875 F.2d 172, 176-77 (8th Cir. 
1989) (proper to have admitted child sexual abuse victim‘s statement to physician and two 
psychologists that her stepbrother abused her; ―The nature and extent of an abuse victim‘s 
psychological problems often depend on the identity of the abuser.‖); United States v. Cherry, 
938 F.2d 748, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1991) (13-year-old victim‘s statements to doctor that defendant 
held her arms down, raped her, and told her not to tell anyone were admissible under FRE 
803(4), because of need for treating psychological manifestations of trauma as well as physical 
ones); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985) (―statements of identity to a 
physician by a child sexually abused by a family member are of a type physicians reasonably 
rely on in composing a diagnosis and course of treatment‖); Williams v. Gov‟t of Virgin Islands, 
271 F.Supp.2d 696, 704-05 n. 1 (D.V.I. 2003); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 287-89, 291 
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(Neb. 2004) (―Dr. Lamberty . . . testified that it is important for him, in assessing the patient‘s 
condition and determining treatment, to know who the perpetrator was, both so that he does not 
release a patient into the care of a perpetrator and for purposes of treating the patient‘s mental 
well-being.‖); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. App. 2005), review denied, 132 P.3d 147 
(Wash. 2006) (2½-year old‘s statement to physician that defendant had hit him).  See State v. 
Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008) (social worker interviewed child in hospital; a social worker‘s 
―primary obligation is not to collect evidence of past events to secure the prosecution of an 
offender, but to protect prospectively a child in need‖; her questioning of child who had suffered 
life threatening injuries yielded nontestimonial responses, which qualified as excited utterances; 
social worker took immediate steps to assure that defendant was not allowed access to child).  
But see Coates v. State, 405 Md. 13, 950 A.2d 114 (2008) (reversible error to admit 7-year-old‘s 
statements to pediatric nurse practitioner identifying sexual abuser, when record did not show 
child understood medical purpose of information); Cassidy v. State, 74 Md. App. 1, 536 A.2d 
666, 682 n.14 (1988) (identity of abuser is generally inadmissible under this hearsay exception, 
although ―When there is danger that an assault victim may have contracted a communicable 
disease, the identity of the assailant may take on significant medical pertinence.‖).  See also 
Robert Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or 
Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257 (1989) (critiquing cases‘ use of FRE 803(4)).  
 
 Indeed, a jurisdiction‘s holding under its tort law that a patient properly states a medical 
malpractice claim against his treating physician for failing to prevent continual, long-term child 
sexual abuse by members of his household, e.g., Bentley v. Carroll, 355 Md. 312, 734 A.2d 697 
(1999), would seem to compel a finding that ―medical treatment‖ under its 5-803(b)(4)-type 
hearsay exception includes protection against continued child abuse. 
 
 B. Are Md. Rule 5-803(b)(4) Statements ―Testimonial‖? 
 
 The United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on which, if any, 5-803(b)(4)-type 
statements are testimonial.  White v. Illinois involved a child‘s 803(b)(4)-type statements as well 
as excited utterances, but the Court‘s opinion in Crawford singled out only the admission of the 
child‘s latter statements to the police officer as being ―in tension‖ with the Crawford rule.  
Again, in dictum in Giles v. California, 128 S.Ct. at 2693, Justice Scalia wrote, ―statements to 
physicians in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only by hearsay 
rules. . . .‖  Yet if this were entirely so, the police could take suspected crime victims to the 
hospital, and prosecutors could offer all their statements that qualified under 5-803(b)(4), without 
ever having to worry about the confrontation clause or calling the victim to testify.  Such a result, 
clearly circumventing Crawford, will not be accepted by the Court. 
 
 Lower courts‘ cases applying Crawford and Davis to 5-803(b)(4)-type statements fall 
into essentially two groups.  One first asks, were the medical personnel acting as agents of law 
enforcement?  If so, then was their purpose – viewed ―objectively‖ – in questioning the child 
primarily to resolve an ―ongoing emergency,‖ thus yielding nontestimonial responses?  Or was 
their primary purpose to obtain facts regarding ―past events‖ that were ―potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution‖ (yielding testimonial responses)? 
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 The other asks, even absent a connection between the police and the health professionals, 
was the latter‘s ―primary purpose‖ medical?   
 
 Under both approaches, the ultimate question is whether the patient/declarant‘s primary 
purpose – viewed ―objectively‖ – in giving the particular information was medical.  See Davis, 
547 U.S. at 822 n.1 (―[E]ven when [police] interrogation exists, it is in the final analysis the 
declarant‘s statements, not the interrogator‘s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us 
to evaluate.‖). 
 
  1. Police Involvement Present or Inferrable 
 
 When there is a clear nexus between law enforcement and the medical professionals – as 
in the case of state-paid SAFE nurses, for example, or when a child is interviewed at a 
governmental child abuse center, the lower courts generally have held the child‘s statements to 
have been made to an agent of the police.  Most of these cases conclude that the child‘s 
statements under these circumstances are testimonial.  E.g., United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 
548, 555-58 (8th Cir. 2005) (child‘s statements in videotaped forensic interview at child abuse 
center, recounted by a doctor who observed the interview, were testimonial, as ―the purpose was 
to collect information for law enforcement,‖ even though the child‘s statements ―may also have 
had a medical purpose‖); State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 2006) (semble).  See Snowden, 
867 A.2d at 300 (child‘s statement testimonial when  ―made to a health or social work 
professional that is working in tandem with law enforcement in furtherance of ongoing and 
formal criminal investigation‖) (emphasis added). 
 
 But when the child has been brought to the hospital by police immediately following the 
incident at issue, some courts have found the ―primary purpose‖ to be medical. E.g., Griner v. 
State, 168 Md. App. 714, 726-46, 899 A.2d 189, 201-08 (2006) (trial court found that 4-year-
old‘s statements as to his existing eye injury to hospital nurse who admitted him to pediatric 
ward were nontestimonial, even though he had been taken to hospital by police; had defense 
preserved question, appellate court would hold that trial court ruled correctly).  See Webster v. 
State, 151 Md. App. 527, 537-53, 827 A.2d 910, 916-25 (2003) (4-year-old child was brought to 
hospital by police; SAFE nurse‘s testimony established that the examination by her and the 
physician had a dual purpose:  ascertainment of what treatment and diagnostic tests are 
necessary, and evidence collection and preservation; in this situation, then, the patient had ―the 
requisite motive for providing the type of ‗sincere and reliable‘ information that is important to 
that [medical] diagnosis and treatment‖).   
 
  2. No Police Involvement 
 
 This ―nontestimonial‖ result has been more commonly found where there was no 
connection shown between the hospital and the police.  See United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 
882, 895-96 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 828 (2006) (statement made by a 3-year-old 
child to his pediatrician during an interview ―for the purpose of ensuring his health and 
protection, [when] there is no evidence that the interview resulted in any referral to law 
enforcement,‖ was nontestimonial); Clark v. State, 199 P.3d 1203 (Alaska App. 2009) (adult 
patient‘s statements to ER personnel that boyfriend hit her were nontestimonial; medical 
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personnel‘s primary purpose, and declarant‘s in going to ER, was current need for medical 
diagnosis and treatment, where declarant heard something break and thought her face might 
become deformed); People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 220 n.20 (Cal. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 
612 (U.S. 2007) (15-year-old victim‘s statement to deputy sheriff who questioned him in hospital 
waiting room was testimonial, but victim‘s statement to surgeon in response to ―What 
happened?‖ was nontestimonial; doctor needed to determine how to treat slash wound; statement 
identified defendant and was admitted under Cal. Evid. Code § 1370 or as excited utterance; 
―primary purpose of the question, and the answer, was . . . to help Dr. Russell deal with the 
immediate medical situation he faced.‖); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. App. 2005) 
(statements to nurse practitioner after ER physician suspected child abuse), aff‘d, 711 N.W.2d 
508 (Minn. 2006) (nurse practitioner was ―not a government questioner and she was not acting in 
concert with or as an agent of the government‖); Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677, 685 (Miss. 2005) 
(―neutral medical evaluation‖; no showing of contact with the police or that medical personnel 
were being used by police); State v. Vaught, 682 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Neb. 2004) (statements to an 
ER physician, after child taken to hospital by family); State v. Fisher, 108 P.3d 1262, 1268-69 
(Wash.App.Div.2 2005) (statement to family practice physician day after child‘s admission to 
hospital), review denied, 132 P.3d 147 (Wash. 2006). 
 
  3. Effect of Child Abuse Reporting Requirement 
 
 Many states‘ statutes require that persons knowing or reasonably suspecting abuse or 
neglect of a child or a vulnerable adult report that information to authorities (to law enforcement 
or social services).  E.g., Md. Code Ann., Fam. Law §§ 5-704, 5-705, 5-705.1, 14-302.  Does this 
requirement make those who report such information ―agents of law enforcement,‖ such that a 
child or vulnerable adult‘s statement to those persons may be considered testimonial?  In a state 
such as Maryland, where the duty to report extends to all persons, id. § 5-705, accepting that 
argument would make everyone in Maryland potentially such an agent.   Concluding that every 
citizen is a government agent seems clearly at odds with Crawford‘s historical rationale. 
 
 The California Supreme Court has held that a reporting requirement did not make a 
child‘s statement to his physician, that his mother had cut his face with a piece of glass, 
testimonial.  The court reasoned: 
 
[T]he reporting statute does not oblige a doctor to investigate or ascertain, for 
purposes of possible criminal prosecution, whether a patient has suffered such 
abuse.  The physician‘s sole duty is to make a report ―whenever [he or she] in his 
or her professional capacity or within the scope of his or her employment, has 
knowledge of or observes a child whom the [physician] knows or reasonably 
suspects has been the victim‖ of abuse or neglect. 
 
The mere fact that doctors must report abuse they see, suspect, or know of in the 
course of practice does not transform them into investigative agents of law 
enforcement.  Nor does it convert their medically motivated questions during the 
examination of minor patients into investigatory interrogations that elicit 
testimonial responses.  Here, despite Dr. Russell‘s incidental status as a 
mandatory reporter of suspected abuse, ―the circumstances objectively indicate‖ 
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that the ―primary purpose‖ of his question, and John‘s answer, was to pinpoint the 
nature of a serious acute injury in order to provide immediate treatment, not to 
establish, for potential criminal purposes, that John was abused.  [FN  As defense 
counsel conceded at oral argument, defendant‘s ―mandatory reporter‖ argument 
would mean that certain statements by a 17-year-old patient to a treating 
physician are automatically testimonial, while an 18-year-old patient‘s identical 
statements, made under identical circumstances for identical reasons, are not.  We 
see no basis to reach such an illogical conclusion.]   
 
People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 219-20 & n.19 (Cal. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citation 
omitted), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 612 (2007).  See State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761, 779-80 (N.J. 
2008) (under circumstances of case, statements to mandatory reporter, social worker, were not 
testimonial).  Contrast with Cage the facts of People v. Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. 2007) 
(plurality decision) (5-year-old child‘s statements to her mother on ride to hospital were 
nontestimonial, but child‘s statements to ―mandatory reporters‖ of child abuse were testimonial, 
where nurse and social worker‘s comments focused on making reports, and they took no other 
action) and State v. Henderson, 160 P.3d 776 (Kan. 2007).   
 
 The lower California appellate court in Cage, affirmed by the California Supreme Court, 
reasoned: 
 
No reasonable person in John‘s shoes would have expected his statements to Dr. 
Russell to be used prosecutorially, at defendant‘s trial.  This is true even if he 
thought the doctor might relay his statements to the police.  After all, anyone who 
obtains information relevant to a criminal investigation might (and certainly 
should) pass it along [to] the police.  This possibility, standing alone, does not 
suffice to make hearsay testimonial within the meaning of Crawford.   
 
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004), aff‘d, 155 P.3d 205 (Cal. 2007), cert. 
denied, 128 S.Ct. 612 (U.S. 2007). 
 
VII. “Tender Years” and “Catch-All” Exceptions 
 
 Because statements of young children recounting their abuse often do not qualify under 
the more ―firmly rooted‖ hearsay exceptions, most state legislatures have adopted ―tender years‖ 
exceptions.  See, e.g., Snowden, 867 A.2d 314 (Md. 2005) (8 and 10-year-old childrens‘ 
statements were testimonial).  California also has a sui generis exception, which was applied in 
Giles, for statements by any victims of recent physical injury or threat of injury.  Cal. Evid. Code 
§ 1370. 
 
 Absent such statutory provisions, other states and the federal courts have employed the 
―catch-all‖ exception of FRE 807 and its state counterparts like Md. Rule 5-803(b)(24) for 
statements of child abuse victims not falling under more specific hearsay exceptions.  E.g., Idaho 
v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) (state court committed reversible error depriving the defendant of 
the right of confrontation by admitting, under the state equivalent of FRE 807, doctor‘s 
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testimony to 2½-year-old child‘s insufficiently reliable statements, identifying the defendant and 
her codefendant as the child‘s abusers). 
 
VIII. Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements When Declarant Testifies; State Law 
Hearsay Exception for Prompt Complaints of Sexual Assault 
 
 Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995) creates an insurmountable ―catch-22‖ for 
child abuse victims.  Tome held that it was reversible error to admit, under FRE 801(d)(1)(B), a 
young child‘s prior consistent statements recounting the charged abuse, on the ground that they 
preceded the motive alleged by the defendant, her father, to fabricate: that she wanted to live 
with her mother.  Upon the mere assertion by the defense of the existence of that motive, it 
would have been impossible for any of the child‘s prior statements to have qualified under the 
Rule, as construed by the majority.  See, e.g., United States v. Bercier, 506 F.3d 625, 629-33 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (reversible error to admit prior consistent statements of sexual assault victim).13  The 
Court of Appeals of Maryland has followed Tome in construing Md. Rule 5-802.1(B).  Holmes v. 
State, 350 Md. 412 (1998). 
 
 But Md. Rule 5-802.1(d) recognizes a hearsay exception for a victim‘s prompt reports of 
sexual assault, where the victim testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement, would be beneficial.  Id.  See, e.g., Nelson v. State, 137 Md. App. 402, 768 A.2d 
738 (2001) (13-year-old girl‘s statement to her 11-year-old sister, made shortly after defendant 
left their apartment, that defendant had raped her, qualified for admission under Md. Rule 5-
802.1(d); victim‘s statements a day later to her school counselor and to a nurse-sexual assault 
examiner would likely also have so qualified, but no objections to them were preserved).  This 
exception, unlike Md. Rule 5-802.1(B), has the decided advantage for the prosecution that it (like 
803 and 804 hearsay exceptions) does not require that the victim testify consistently with the out-
of-court statement. 
 
IX. Maryland’s Hearsay Exceptions Derived from Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6):  A Criminal 
Statute and a Civil Rule 
 
 A. The Criminal Statute 
 
 The Maryland forfeiture-hearsay exception statute, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code 
Ann. § 10-901, was originally adopted in 2005.
14
  Its kernel contains the ―intent-to-prevent‖ 
                                                 
13 Tome is explicitly based only on construction of FRE 801(d)(1)(B), and not on any constitutional requirement.  
The Rule, therefore, can and should be amended to encompass all prior consistent statements (subject to FRE 403 
and 611(a)) that would be helpful to a reasonable jury in evaluating what effect, if any, to give to impeachment of an 
alleged child abuse victim evidence.  See Lynn McLain, Post-Crawford: Time to Liberalize the Substantive 
Admissibility of a Testifying Witness‟s Prior Consistent Statements, 74 UMKC L. REV. 1 (2005).   
14 The Maryland statute recognizes the following hearsay exception: 
 
   (a) During the trial of a criminal case in which the defendant is charged with a felonious 
violation of Title 5 of the Criminal Law Article or with the commission of a crime of violence as 
defined in 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article, a statement as defined in Maryland Rule 5-801(a) 
is not excluded by the hearsay rule if the statement is offered against a party that has engaged in, 
directed, or conspired to commit wrongdoing that was intended to and did procure the 
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testimony requirement of FRE 804(b)(6), but jettisons the ―acquiescence‖ terminology in favor 
of ―directed or conspired in. . . .‖   
 
  1. Restrictive in Scope:  Types of Cases 
 
 Due to amendments made to Governor Ehrlich‘s original bill by the House Judiciary 
Committee, unlike the corollary FRE 804(b)(6), the Maryland statute is restricted so as to 
apply only to trials for certain crimes.  The statute applies only to crimes involving either 
drug distribution (―felonious violations of Title 5 of the Criminal Law Article‖) or those that 
qualify as “crimes of violence as defined in 14-101 of the Criminal Law Article.‖  The latter 
category does not include, for example, second degree assault (which is often charged in 
domestic violence cases).   
 
 This unprecedented restrictive approach has engendered piecemeal annual amendments.  
In the 2006 session § 14-101 of the Criminal Law article was amended to include ―child abuse 
in the first degree under § 3-601 of [the Criminal Law] article‖ as a ―crime of violence.‖  In 
2007 the General Assembly added ―sexual abuse of a minor under § 3-602 of [the Criminal 
Law] article if:  (i) the victim is under the age of 13 years and the offender is an adult at the time 
of the offense; and (ii) the offense involved: (1) vaginal intercourse, as defined in § 3-301 of this 
article; (2) a sexual act, as defined in § 3-301 of this article; (3) an act in which a part of the 
offender‘s body penetrates, however slightly, into the victim‘s genital opening or anus; or (4) the 
intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the victim‘s or the offender‘s genital, anal, or 
other intimate area for sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse‖ and ―continuing course of 
                                                                                                                                                             
unavailability of the declarant of the statement, as defined in Maryland Rule 5-804. 
 
(b) Subject to subsection (c) of this section, before admitting a statement under this section, the 
court shall hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury at which: 
 
  (1) The Maryland Rules of Evidence are strictly applied; and 
 
  (2) The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the party against 
whom the statement is offered engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit the 
wrongdoing that procured the unavailability of the declarant, 
 
(c) A statement may not be admitted under this section unless: 
 
  (1) The statement was: 
 
   (i) Given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other 
proceeding or in a deposition; 
(ii) Reduced to writing and signed by the declarant; or  
(iii) Recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means 
contemporaneously with the making of the statement; and 
 
  (2) As soon as is practicable after the proponent of the statement learns that the declarant will be 
unavailable, the proponent notifies the adverse party of: 
 
   (i) The intention to offer the statement;  
   (ii) The particulars of the statement; and 
   (iii) The identity of the witness through whom the statement will be offered. 
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conduct with a child under § 3-315 of the Criminal Law article.‖ 
 
  2. Departure from Usual Procedure under Md. Rule 5-104(a) 
 
 The Maryland statute provides that, unlike the procedure followed in federal court, or in 
other preliminary determinations by State trial judges (outside the hearing of the jury) as to 
admissibility of evidence under Md. Rule 5-104(a), the other Maryland Rules of evidence 
(including the hearsay rule) will be “strictly applied” at this preliminary stage.  This 
provision virtually guts the bill.  An intimidated or dead witness will not appear to testify to her 
intimidation or murder.  The preliminary facts regarding the opposing party‘s wrongdoing thus 
must be proved either by the testimony of another witness who has first-hand knowledge of 
them, or by the unavailable witness‘s out-of-court statements that qualify under a hearsay 
exception, such as that for excited utterances. 
 
 Secondly, unlike the ordinary burden of a preponderance of the evidence with regard to 
proof of preliminary facts, the statute applies a burden of “clear and convincing evidence.”  
Before the adoption of this statute, the Maryland case law had applied the clear and convincing 
standard only to preliminary proof of an accused‘s Md. Rule 5-404(b) ―other crimes,‖ which is 
then to be admitted before the jury, the trier of fact.  Under the forfeiture hearsay exception, in 
contrast, the jury does not hear of the party‘s wrongdoing that made the witness unavailable, but 
only of the unavailable declarant‘s out-of-court statement.  (It should be noted, however, that 
evidence of that wrongdoing might come in under a preexisting, independent route, such as that 
of wrongful acts showing ―guilty knowledge.‖  See Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5), Committee Note.) 
 
  3. Restrictive in Scope:  Types of Out-of-Court Statements 
 
 The types of statements potentially admissible under the Maryland law is narrowed 
from those permissible under FRE 804(b)(6), to only recorded or written and signed statements 
(the same types that also are potentially substantively admissible prior inconsistent statements 
under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a), when the declarant testifies at trial).   
 
 Thus, statements made by those witnesses who were murdered preemptively or 
intimidated before their statements were recorded or written and signed are not included under 
the Maryland codifications, as they would be under federal law.  See United States v. Rivera, 292 
F. Supp. 2d 827 (E.D. Va. 2003) (declarant‘s oral statements to her guardian and attorney). 
 
  4. Notice 
 
 The Maryland law adds a requirement that the proponent of the evidence must provide 
notice of its intent to offer evidence under this hearsay exception.   
 
 B. The Civil Rule 
 
 The hearsay exception provision applicable in civil cases, new Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5), 
which became effective January 1, 2006, incorporates the ―directed or conspired‖ language, the 
notice requirement, and the restriction as to types of statements that are codified in the Maryland 
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criminal statute.
15
  The Rule, however, does not restrict the types of civil cases to which the Rule 
applies; nor does it change the procedure typically followed under Md. Rule 5-104(a). 
 
X. Other Significant Developments 
 
 A. Melendez-Diaz 
 
 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S.Ct. 2527 (2009) (state lab certificate of drug 
analysis was testimonial, but some indication that a notice and demand statute like Maryland‘s 
will be upheld).  Cf. Briscoe v. Virginia, cert. granted, 129 S.Ct. 2858 (U.S. No. 09-11191) 
(attacking Virginia‘s statute, which provides for the accused to call the analyst as his or her own 
witness). 
 
 B. Rule 5-802.1(a):  Certain Prior Inconsistent Statements 
 
 To clarify that the declarant‘s adoption by signature will suffice, and that the declarant 
need not have been the one to reduce the statement to writing, Md. Rule 5-802.1(a)(2) was 
amended by order of November 8, 2005, effective January 1, 2006, to read:  ―A statement that is 
inconsistent with the declarant‘s testimony if the statement was . . . (2) reduced to writing and 
was signed by the declarant. . . .‖ 
 
 C. Rule 5-802.1(c):  Prior Statements of Identification 
 
 See Jones v. State, 395 Md. 97, 909 A.2d 650 (2006) (reversible error to preclude defense 
from calling detective who presented photo array to testify at suppression hearing). 
                                                 
15 Md. Rule 5-804(b)(5) provides: 
 
(b) Hearsay Exceptions.  The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is 
unavailable as a witness: 
  * * * 
(5) Witness Unavailable Because of Party‟s Wrongdoing 
(A) Civil Actions.  In civil actions in which a witness is unavailable because of a party‘s 
wrongdoing, a statement that (i) was (a) given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury 
at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition; (b) reduced to writing and was 
signed by the declarant; or (c) recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic 
or electronic means contemporaneously with the making of the statement, and (ii) is 
offered against a party who has engaged in, directed, or conspired to commit 
wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the 
declarant as a witness, provided however, the statement may not be admitted unless, as 
soon as practicable after the proponent of the statement learns that the declarant will be 
unavailable, the proponent makes known to the adverse party the intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it. 
(B) Criminal Causes.  In criminal causes in which a witness is unavailable because of a 
party‘s wrongdoing, admission of the witness‘s statement under this exception is 
governed by Code, Courts Article, § 10-901. 
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 D. Rule 5-803(a):  Statement of Party Opponent 
 
 See Brown v. Daniel Realty Co., 2009 WL 2085548 (Md. Jul. 22, 2009) (a deponent is a 
―party,‖ for purposes of Md. Rule 2-419(a)(2) permitting a litigant to use an adverse party‘s 
deposition for any purpose, only if the deponent remains a party at the time that the deposition is 
offered into evidence; child‘s next friend was not a ―party‖). 
 
 E. Rule 5-803(b)(3):  Direct Assertion of Declarant‘s State of Mind 
 
 See Figgins v. Cochrane, 174 Md. App. 1, 27-31, 920 A.2d 572 (2007) (Hillmon analysis 
inapplicable when no contention that declarant subsequently acted in accord with stated intent), 
aff‟d, 403 Md. 392, 942 A.2d 736 (2008). 
 
 F. Rule 5-803(b)(6):  Business Records 
 
 Hall v. University of Maryland Medical Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67, 919 A.2d 1177 (2007) 
(reversible error to exclude statements written by doctors, reporting what nurses and residents 
had said, regarding pathologically germane information). 
 
 G. Rule 5-803(b)(8):  Public Records/―Business Records‖ of the State? 
 
 In Rollins v. State, the Court of Appeals affirmed a Court of Special Appeals‘ decision 
that ―the findings in an autopsy report of the physical condition of a decedent, which are routine, 
descriptive and not analytical, [and] which are objectively ascertained‖ were non-testimonial.  
The medical examiner-declarant had moved to California and did not testify, but his deputy 
medical examiner testified, basing her testimony on the autopsy report.  The trial court had 
redacted some of the original medical examiner‘s opinions regarding ―disease . . . [,] smothering 
. . . [and] homicide . . . by asphyxiation.‖  In an opinion by Judge Greene, a unanimous Court of 
Appeals held: 
 
[T]he autopsy report, as redacted, contained non-testimonial hearsay 
statements in nature that were admissible under either the business or public 
records exceptions to the hearsay rule.  We further hold that, under the facts of 
the instant case, the availability of a witness is immaterial to the question of 
admissibility of hearsay evidence under either the business or public records 
exception.  Opinions, speculation, and other conclusions drawn from the 
objective findings in autopsy reports are testimonial and should be redacted 
before the report is admitted into evidence. 
* * * 
The information that was not redacted from the autopsy report, while it might 
eventually be used in a criminal trial, was not created for that express purpose, 
and was statutorily required to be determined by the medical examiner and placed 
into the report pursuant to § 5-311 of the Health General Article. 
 
 In contrast to Rollins, see United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding 
autopsy reports to be nontestimonial business records and public records and affirming 
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conviction, when only a doctor from the medical examiner‘s office who had not conducted the 
autopsies testified at trial as to the autopsies).   
 
 With a focus on the routine nature of the statement, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit has held that public records contained in the accused‘s ―penitentiary packet‖ 
– records of his convictions, his fingerprints and a photograph – were not testimonial.  Moreover, 
their certification as accurate copies of those public records, by the Oklahoma records custodian 
and by Oklahoma‘s Secretary of State, were also routine, non-testimonial statements, United 
States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1076-77 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1911 (U.S. 
2006). 
 
 H. Rule 5-804(b)(2):  Dying Declarations 
 
 In its first post-Davis decision, the Court of Special Appeals relied on Davis to conclude 
that a dying declaration was nontestimonial (but see supra n.3).  In Head v. State, 171 Md. App. 
642, 912 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 395 Md. 315, 920 A.2d 1059 (2007), the first police officer 
arriving at the scene of a shooting asked the victim, ―Who shot you?‖  The victim, who died 
within the hour, answered ―Bobby.‖ 
 
 Judge Salmon, writing for the panel in a manner reminiscent of Louis L‘Amour, pointed 
out ―the strong smell of gunpowder still in the air.‖  That fact, coupled with the officer‘s 
testimony that the victim ―kept ‗yelling out‘ the words ‗help me, help me,‘‖ ―the situation was 
‗chaotic,‘‖ the officer ―‗didn‘t even know if . . . the person who caused that gunpowder was still 
in the house,‘‖ and ―in the officer‘s view, it was still ‗potentially even a dangerous situation. . . 
,‘‖ led the panel to conclude that the statement was nontestimonial under Davis, because, 
―Viewed objectively, the primary purpose of Officer George‘s question does not appear to have 
been either to establish or prove past events for possible use at a trial.‖ 
 
 I. Rule 5-805:  Multiple Levels of OCS‘s Within One OCS 
 
 See Cooley v. State, 157 Md. App. 101, 111, 849 A.2d 1026 (2004), rev‘d on other 
grounds, 385 Md. 165, 867 A.2d 1065 (2005) (one level of OCS was nonhearsay and the other 
was hearsay falling within an exception). 
 
 J. Doctor‘s Apology 
 
 Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 10-920 provides that expressions ―of regret or 
apology‖ – as opposed to admissions ―of liability or fault‖ – made by or on behalf of a health 
care provider are ―inadmissible as evidence of an admission of liability or as evidence of an 
admission against interest.‖ 
 
 K. Impeachment of Nontestifying Hearsay Declarants: Md. Rule 5-806 
 
 Taylor v. State, 407 Md. 137, 963 A.2d 197 (2009), held that impeachment of a key, non-
testifying declarant by extrinsic evidence of a prior bad act under Md. Rule 5-608(b) must be 
allowed, if it would be permitted if the declarant had testified at trial. 
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XI. Hypotheticals 
 
 Are the following statements testimonial? 
 
 a. A domestic violence victim‘s excited utterance to a police officer who arrives at 
her door?  If she is saying, ―He‘s got a gun!‖ 
 
 b. A 911 call by a witness to a stabbing?  If he is seeking an ambulance?  If he is 
seeking police assistance? 
 
 c. A police lab technician‘s report on a defendant‘s blood alcohol level?  The DNA 
of blood found at a crime scene? 
 
 d. A hospital report as to blood analysis of a ―regular‖ patient?  Of a patient brought 
in by police for DUI? 
 
 e. (i)    If a neighbor asks to have a 7-year-old child come over ―to help around the 
house‖ and the child tells his mother, ―I don‘t want to go!  He did something bad 
to me last time,‖ is the child‘s statement testimonial? 
 
(ii)    If the mother calls Social Services and takes the child in for an interview 
because of suspected child abuse, are the child‘s statements to the social worker 
testimonial?  Does it matter whether a police officer is present during the 
interview?  If the officer is in plain clothes and the child does not know that s/he 
is an officer? 
(iii)    Would it matter if the social worker was employed by a private agency or a 
church, rather than the local government? 
 
(iv)    If the mother instead takes the child to the hospital, are the child‘s 
statements to the doctor and nurses – describing the abuse and identifying the 
abuser – testimonial?  Of what import is it that all Maryland citizens have a duty 
to report child abuse?  See Griner v. State, 168 Md. App. 714, 899 A.2d 189, 201-
08 (2006). 
 
   (v)    Does it matter whether the child is 3, or 7, or 12? 
 
 f. Is a mentally disabled victim who is called by the prosecution – to demonstrate 
her limited mental capacity, rather than to testify to the alleged crime against her 
– a witness under the Sixth Amendment?  (P.G. County trial, Feb. 2006). 
 
 g. With regard to whether a domestic violence victim‘s statement is testimonial, is it 
significant that many/most DV victims do not cooperate with the prosecution at 
trial?  Would they cooperate long enough to have a preliminary hearing? 
 
 h. Is pleading with a domestic violence victim not to testify ―wrongdoing‖?  Can one 
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get a ―no contact‖ order pending trial? 
 
 i. Is a letter, ―to be opened in the event of my death,‖ testimonial? 
 
 j. What about a statement of fear to a friend, ―I‘m afraid my husband is going to kill 
me one of these days‖?  Testimonial or not? 
 
XII. Appendix:  Fact Patterns 
 
Stoddard v. State, 887 A.2d 564 (Md. 2005) 
 
Erik (boyfriend of Calen‘s mother) had been babysitting 3-year-old Calen, her older 
brother, and her cousin, 1½-year-old Jasmine, on the day Calen died. 
 
In Erik‘s trial for Calen‘s murder, prosecution calls Jasmine‘s mother to testify that – 
though they had never discussed Erik‘s involvement – after Calen‘s death, Jasmine 
became afraid of strangers and loud noises [wincing, hiding, and crying] and began 
having nightmares and running into her mother‘s room, asking, ―Is Erik going to get 
me?‖ 
 
* * * 
 
Griner v. State, 899 A.2d 189 (Md. 2006) 
 
At 10:00 a.m., two police officers responded to a call requesting they check on the 
welfare of 4-2/3-year-old Chase, who was being raised by his grandmother-defendant, as 
her own child.  They saw that Chase‘s right eye was swollen and partially shut; he had a 
cut above the eye, with stitches in it.   
 
Grandmother said that Chase had fallen at a skating rink, and he had received medical 
attention.  When Grandmother permitted one officer to speak separately with Chase, he 
said he had fallen on a step.  When asked, Chase said he had not gone to a doctor; 
defendant had stitched the cut.  Police called for an ambulance to have paramedics 
examine Chase‘s eye. 
 
Ambulance took Chase to hospital.  Both an officer and defendant followed in their 
vehicles.  County social worker questioned Chase at 12:00 noon.  Chase said he hurt his 
eye when he fell on the ice at a skating rink.  When the LCSW asked Chase about his 
―mom,‖ Chase said that she hit him a lot ―all over,‖ with a ―pow stick,‖ a cane, and a belt.  
He said that she hit him in the eye with the pow stick the preceding day, and that she 
stitched the cut above his eye.  Chase said that defendant would tie him to his bed and 
that once, while tied up, he had gone 3 days without food:  he would be untied to use the 
bathroom, and he had been given water, because he apologized. 
 
A police detective arrived, spoke with the LCSW, and then interviewed Chase, while 
various doctors and nurses were in and out of the room as they attended to Chase‘s 
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medical needs.  [When asked by a doctor what happened, Chase said he had fallen.  
When Chase became upset, doctor ceased questioning.]  Chase was admitted to hospital.  
A registered Nurse saw Chase in the pediatric ward after he was sent from the ER.  Nurse 
found Chase‘s right eye to be ―really swollen and red‖ and that he had two sutures above 
the eye.  Nurse introduced herself as a nurse, explained to Chase that she was going to 
take care of him, and that she would examine him from ―head to toe.‖  Nurse asked 
Chase if he could open his injured eye wide enough to see clearly, and Chase said that he 
could.  She touched the eye lightly and noted that ―it was pretty warm to the touch.‖  She 
noted that ―he had various scars and bruises throughout his body.‖  The scars ―were like 
U- and C-shaped marks.‖  
 
When Nurse asked Chase what happened to his eye, he replied that he had fallen.  Upon 
seeing the other bruises and scars, she asked Chase if he was sure he had fallen.  Chase 
responded:  ―[W]ell actually my mom hit me with a stick.‖  When Nurse asked why his 
mom hit him, Chase answered that it was because he had been ―a bad boy‖ and had not 
done his ―math and spelling lessons.‖  Nurse asked Chase about the scars on his body, 
and he stated that his mom had hit him with a stick. 
 
Chase was released from the hospital and taken to a foster home the next day.  Twelve 
days later, a Department of Health and Human Services pediatrician examined Chase, in 
the presence of the LCSW.  When the doctor asked what happened, he stated that his 
mother hit him with a stick because he was bad and did not do his math. 
 
Upon removing Chase‘s clothing, the doctor observed ―all these bruises, old scars really, 
of injury to his skin.‖  He had ―linear scars‖ on his body and ―loop marks‖ on his back 
and thighs.  Chase indicated that he had gotten the loop marks on his thighs when 
appellant hit him with an ―electric.‖  Chase also said that appellant had hit him with a 
stick on his eye and that no one else had hit him. 
 
The doctor testified at trial that she did not ask Chase leading questions and did not 
suggest to him what had happened to him.  She opined that, due to the location of the 
loop marks and the pattern of marks, the marks were intentionally inflicted and were 
consistent with having been caused by use of an electrical cord. 
 
* * * 
 
State v. Fowler, 500 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio 1985) 
 
On October 14, at 7:00 p.m., Kimberly, a 14-year-old girl, was reported missing to the 
police by her mother and stepfather.  An hour later, the child was located at a friend‘s 
residence and officers were dispatched to that address.  They located Kimberly hiding 
behind some boxes in an upstairs cubbyhole.  Her aspect was described as upset and 
scared.  When the police asked why she had run away from home, Kimberly related that 
her stepfather had involved her in ongoing acts of incest, imposing oral sex upon her.  
She told police that she had seen a movie that evening called ―Something About Amelia‖ 
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which dealt with the problem of incest, and at that time she realized ―what had been 
going on in her life.‖ 
 
Kimberly was relayed to the police station where she provided a written statement 
alleging that her stepfather initiated sexual activity with her when she was a third grader.  
She indicated that she had most recently been importuned by him the previous evening. 
 
Kimberly did not testify at trial. 
 
* * * 
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990) 
 
5½-year-old girl told her father‘s girlfriend that her mother held her down while her 
mother‘s boyfriend has sexual intercourse with her, and that she had seen them do the 
same thing to her 2½-year-old sister (who was living with defendants).  Father‘s 
girlfriend made a police report and took 5½-year-old to hospital.  Dr. Jambura found 
medical evidence of sexual abuse. 
 
Police and welfare officials then took 2½-year-old into protective custody.  The following 
day, Dr. Jambura found physical evidence ―strongly suggestive of sexual abuse with 
vaginal contact,‖ occurring approximately 2 or 3 days earlier.  He testified that he asked 
the 2½-year-old a series of questions, about breakfast, etc., then culminating in ―Does 
daddy touch you with his pee-pee?‖   She responded that he did, ―but he does it a lot 
more with my sister than with me.‖ 
 
* * * 
 
State v. Buda, 949 A.2d 761 (N.J. 2008) 
 
When defendant (child‘s mother‘s boyfriend) came to pick up 3-year-old, child started 
crying.  Child was routinely picked up by his mother and did not cry. 
 
Compare if child had said, ―I‘m afraid of defendant,‖ or ―I‘m afraid of defendant, 
because he beats me.‖ 
 
 
 
 
(For detailed discussions of the hearsay case law, see LYNN MCLAIN, VOL. 6A MARYLAND 
EVIDENCE: STATE AND FEDERAL §§ 801:1 et seq., (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2009) (available 
online at Westlaw; input the volume number then ―Maryland Evidence‖ and then the 
section number you seek).  To purchase a copy — of the treatise and annual pocket parts 
(vols. 5, 6, and 6A) — or of the 2007 edition of the Rules book (vol. 7), please contact 
the publisher at 1-800-344-5009.) 
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